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Abstract
We study a boundedly rational model of imitation when payoﬀ distributions of actions diﬀer across
types of individuals. Individuals observe others’ actions and payoﬀs, and a comparison signal. One of
two ineﬃciencies always arises: (i) uniform adoption, i.e., all individuals choose the action that is optimal
for one type but sub-optimal for the other, or (ii) dual incomplete learning, i.e., only a fraction of each
type chooses its optimal action. Which one occurs depends on the composition of the population and how
critical the choice is for diﬀerent types of individuals. In an application, we show that a monopolist serving
a population of boundedly rational consumers cannot fully extract the surplus of high-valuation consumers,
but can sell to consumers who do not value the good.
Key words : Imitation, heterogeneous populations, bounded rationality, Fubini extension.
JEL codes: D81, D83.
1 Introduction
We study decision-making when individuals have little information about the outcome of choosing among
diﬀerent actions. Although individuals may use information from their own experience, they may also use
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information obtained by observing other individuals.1 In many situations, however, it is unlikely that the
same choice yields similar outcomes to diﬀerent individuals. For instance, if a farmer observes another farmer
from a diﬀerent geographic area, who obtains high profits after adopting hybrid maize, this may suggest that
she should adopt hybrid maize as well. Yet, she may intuit that she might not reach such a high profit if her
farm is located in a remote area with poor infrastructure, where obtaining hybrid seeds and fertilizers is much
more costly.2 The literature on boundedly rational learning and imitation has paid little attention to how
individuals learn in the presence of heterogeneity. In particular, do all individuals converge to the same action
or does each individual converge to her optimal choice? What factors determine the actions that are chosen in
the long run? This paper oﬀers answers to these and other related questions.
Our framework is similar to the setup of boundedly rational learning in social contexts (e.g., Ellison and
Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; Schlag 1998). Here individuals learn from their own and others’ experiences in a process
of repeated decision making. Hence, these models provide a natural environment for analyzing the implications
of heterogeneity. We consider a population of individuals of two diﬀerent, fixed and exogenously given, types (A
and B) who repeatedly choose between two actions (a and b). Payoﬀs are determined according to distribution
functions that are unknown to the individuals and that depend on the individual’s type and chosen action. The
expected payoﬀ of a (b) is greater than the expected payoﬀ of b (a) for type A (B) individuals. An individual
makes choices by considering only three pieces of information: (i) her own most recent choice and consequent
payoﬀ, (ii) the most recent choice and payoﬀ of a randomly sampled individual in the population, and (iii) a
random comparison signal. The comparison signal an individual observes is informative about the diﬀerence
between the individual’s and the observed individual’s expected payoﬀ associated with the observed individual’s
choice. In our example of the farmers above, the comparison signal originates from the information they may
have about the diﬀerence in costs of obtaining seeds and fertilizer for hybrid maize. This information suggests
to a remotely located farmer that she may not obtain as high profits as a farmer located in a geographic area
with better infrastructure, if she follows him in adopting hybrid maize. Whenever an individual observes an
action diﬀerent from the one that she is currently using, she makes a new choice using a decision rule. The
decision rule is a mapping from the payoﬀs obtained by herself and the observed individual, and the observed
comparison signal, to the probability of switching to the action of the observed individual. We confine our
analysis to a class of decision rules that are linear in observed payoﬀs and the comparison signal. We show
(Proposition 1) that linearity and the unbiasedness of comparison signals combined yield payoﬀ-ordering, i.e.,
on average, given that an individual observes the two actions, she is most likely to make the right choice.3
1The role of imitation has been widely documented both empirically and experimentally (e.g., Munshi 2004 and Apesteguia,
Huck, Oechssler 2007, respectively). See also Young (2009).
2This example is inspired in the analysis of hybrid maize adoption among heterogeneous farmers in Kenya (Suri 2011).
3See, e.g., Schlag (1998), Morales (2002), and Borgers, Morales and Sarin (2004) for related analysis in learning models with
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Under homogeneity this property drives the whole population to choose optimally: optimal actions become
popular and hence more likely to be sampled and chosen (see, e.g., Schlag 1998). Heterogeneity interferes with
this implicit popularity weighting, leading to the ineﬃciencies discussed below.4
In our model learning is always incomplete: either (i) all individuals converge to make the same choice,
which is optimal for one type but suboptimal for the other, or (ii) only a fraction of the populations of both
types choose their optimal action. We refer to these two cases as uniform adoption and dual incomplete
learning, respectively. Which one occurs is determined by two factors: (i) each type’s size, i.e., the fraction of
each type in the population and (ii) the sensitivity of each type’s decision problem, i.e., each type’s diﬀerence
in expected payoﬀs across actions. Our main results (Lemma 1 and Theorem 1) characterize the long run
ineﬃciency that arises (uniform adoption or dual incomplete learning) in terms of the sizes and sensitivities of
each type. If one type is much larger or has a much more sensitive decision problem than the other, the whole
population converges to choose that type’s optimal action. On the other hand, a population that is relatively
balanced in terms of sizes and sensitivities exhibits dual incomplete learning.
In our benchmark model, we assume uniform sampling, i.e., each individual samples each of the others
with uniform probabilities. Our framework, however, can be tractably generalized to allow for biased sampling.
We consider both homophily and heterophily, i.e., bias toward sampling individuals of the same type and of a
diﬀerent type, respectively.5 We show (Proposition 2) that the predictions are qualitatively similar to those
obtained under uniform sampling. Furthermore, the more homophilous a type is, the greater their fraction
that choose their optimal action and the smaller is the fraction of the other type that ends up choosing their
optimal action.
We apply our results to a model where a rational monopolist, who has structural knowledge of the economy,
faces boundedly rational consumers with heterogeneous valuations for her good.6 The population is composed
of two types of consumers: those whose expected valuation of the good is positive and those whose expected
valuation is zero. We characterize the profit-maximizing price of the monopolist and show that bounded
rationality leads to lower profits for the monopoly and a larger deadweight loss in comparison to full information.
The monopolist cannot charge a price that extracts all the consumer surplus from consumers with positive
expected valuation. This would make their problem sensitivity equal to zero and all consumers would converge
linear response to observed payoﬀs.
4The ineﬃciencies caused by heterogeneity are not confined to payoﬀ-ordering decision rules. Indeed, it can be shown that a
decision rule would lead both populations to converge to choose their respective optimal actions only if the problem is “trivial”,
i.e., if for each individual, the revised probability of choosing her optimal action is one every time she observes both actions.
5Homophilic tendencies are widely documented (see Currarini, Jackson and Pin 2009 and the references therein). The results
of other extensions are discussed in section 6.
6Models in which rational firms interact with boundedly rational consumers in the market have recently been studied, for
instance, in Spiegler (2006) and (2011) and Alos-Ferrer, Kirchsteiger and Walzl (2010).
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to not buying the good. Therefore, consumers with positive expected valuation are better oﬀ than under full
information. The other consumers, however, converge to buy a good that they do not value and hence, are
worse oﬀ than under full information.
Related literature. In Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) and Schlag (1998), individuals receive feedback
about their own and others’ choices and make decisions according to cognitively simple rules (for a thorough
survey, see Alos-Ferrer and Schlag 2009). In homogeneous populations, relatively simple imitation rules allow
most individuals to choose the optimal action over the long run (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg 1995, Schlag
1998). In contrast, in our analysis, the uniform adoption of one action is not optimal. Furthermore, it is
possible that both actions are chosen over the long run by a positive fraction of each type.7
In Ellison and Fudenberg (1993), individuals observe only neighbors who, in most cases, have the same
optimal actions. The smaller the “window” of neighbors an individual observes, the greater is the fraction of
the population that chooses an optimal action in the long run. This is somewhat related to our result that
more segregated types achieve better long-run outcomes. Their assumptions on the structure of sampling and
heterogeneity, however, prevent their model from generating uniform adoption8 or allowing the sizes of the
types to play a role in the analysis.9
Finally, Neary (2012) analyzes a population of individuals who repeatedly play an asymmetric coordination
game. He finds that an action is more likely to appear in the long run if it is preferred by the largest type, or if
it is more strongly preferred by one of the types. While Neary’s (2012) focus is on Group-Darwinian dynamics
within strategic settings, our analysis aims to reveal the merits and limitations of simple imitation rules in
problems of decision under uncertainty.
2 Framework
In this section we provide the framework from which the parameters of the dynamical system (to be formally
introduced in the next section) are derived.
Individual-action types. There are two types of individuals in the population W , denoted by A and B,
i.e., W = A [ B. The measure of the set of type A individuals in the population is denoted by ↵ 2 (0, 1)
and the measure of type B individuals is 1   ↵; furthermore, ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T := {A,B} denote generic types of
7Along with this literature, our analysis is fundamentally diﬀerent from the study of Bayesian sequential observational learning
(e.g., Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992, and Smith and Sorensen 2000).
8Since our benchmark model assumes uniform sampling and generates uniform adoption, and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993)
assume non-uniform sampling and do not generate uniform adoption, one may ask whether uniform sampling is what leads to
uniform adoption (when it occurs). Our extension to biased sampling, however, reveals that in our model uniform adoption is
consistent with non-uniform sampling.
9An additional technical diﬀerence is that, while in Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) and Schlag (1998) time is discrete,
here we have chosen to analyze a continuous time model (for details, see Section 3).
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individuals. At each time t 2 R+, each individual i 2 W has chosen an action c 2 S := {a, b} and she revises
this decision from time to time as described below.
Payoﬀs and comparison signals. The chosen action yields a payoﬀ (rate) x in a finite set X ⇢ [0, 1];
thus, there is a lower and upper bound for payoﬀs represented by 0 and 1, respectively. The payoﬀ distribution
is the same for all type ⌧ individuals, it is time homogeneous, and its expected value and distribution function
are denoted by ⇡⌧c and µ⌧c, respectively, for all ⌧ 2 T and c 2 S. In particular, an individual’s payoﬀ at time t
depends only on her choice and type (and the state of the world) –but not on the choices of other individuals.
Individuals do not know ⇡⌧c or µ⌧c. We assume that a is the optimal action for type A individuals and b is
the optimal action for type B, i.e., ⇡Aa > ⇡Ab and ⇡Ba < ⇡Bb. We refer to the gains of type A individuals from
choosing their optimal action over their suboptimal action, i.e., ⇡Aa   ⇡Ab, as the sensitivity of their decision
problem. The sensitivity of the decision problem of type B individuals is analogously defined.
When at time t, a type ⌧ 2 T individual i observes a type ⌧ 0 2 T individual who has chosen d 2 S, she also
observes a comparison signal, denoted by  . The comparison signal takes values in a finite set   ⇢ [ 1, 1];
its distribution function, denoted by µ⌧⌧ 0d, is assumed to be time homogeneous and the same for all type ⌧
individuals observing a type ⌧ 0 individual who has chosen d. The comparison signal is interpreted as information
about the relative performance of the type ⌧ individual if she were to choose d, compared to the performance
of a type ⌧ 0 individual when he chooses d. The comparison signal is assumed to be unbiased in the sense that
its expected value, denoted by ⇡⌧⌧ 0d, is assumed to be equal to ⇡⌧d  ⇡⌧ 0d. Therefore, the expected value of the
comparison signal is positive (negative) when the individual who observes it would do better (worse) with d
than the observed individual. For instance, if i observes   > 0 when she samples j who chose d, this may be
interpreted as the judgement “on average, I would obtain   more than j if I choose d.”
Individual states. We define individual states as a combination of type, action, obtained payoﬀ, and
comparison signals   := (⌧, c, x,  A,  B) 2 T ⇥ S ⇥ X ⇥  2 =: ⌃. The comparison signals  A and  B act as
latent variables such that at most one of them activates when a diﬀerent action is observed to be chosen by a
type A individual or a type B individual, respectively, the next time that the individual revises her action.
Intensities and sampling. At time t 2 R+, every individual observes another individual whose state is
  2 ⌃ with an intensity that, under the assumption of uniform sampling adopted here, corresponds exactly
to the fraction of individuals in the state   within the population at time t. Upon observing the action and
payoﬀ of the sampled individual and the comparison signal corresponding to the sampled individual’s type,
the individual reviews her choice using a decision rule that we now describe.
Decision rules. Individuals are boundedly rational and make choices according to a decision rule. As
is common in the literature (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg 1995, Cubitt and Sugden 1998), we assume that
5
individuals contemplate switching actions only when they observe an action diﬀerent from the one that they
are currently choosing. In this case, the probability of switching to the sampled action is determined by the
decision rule (and otherwise individuals simply stick with their current action). Formally, the decision rule is a
function that maps the observed payoﬀs and the comparison signal to the probability of switching to the other
action when it is sampled. We denote this function by L, thus L : [0, 1]2⇥ [ 1, 1]! [0, 1]. Therefore, L(x, y,  )
is the probability that an individual switches, given that she obtained the payoﬀ x, observed an individual
who chose a diﬀerent action and obtained the payoﬀ y, and observed the comparison signal  . Notice that the
decision rule L is valid only when a diﬀerent action is observed, and that   =  A if the sampled individual’s
type is A and   =  B if the sampled individual’s type is B.10
In spite of their severe information restrictions, there are decision rules that allow individuals to be more
likely to choose their optimal action every time they observe two diﬀerent actions (and hence contemplate
switching) –regardless of the specific payoﬀ distributions or those of the comparison signals. We call this prop-
erty payoﬀ-ordering and show that only decision rules that are linear in observed payoﬀs and the comparison
signal satisfy this property. Below, in Section 3, we assume that payoﬀs and comparison signals are independent
from each other and across individuals, but for now we aim to define payoﬀ-ordering in a more robust manner,
without imposing independence. In particular we assume that the probability mass function of the join vector
(x, y,  ) 2 X ⇥X ⇥  is time homogenous and the same for every pair of individuals (i, j) 2 W 2 whose respec-
tive types and actions are (⌧, c) and (⌧ 0, d), with c 6= d. The corresponding probability mass function is denoted
by µ⌧c,⌧ 0d and the expected value of L is denoted by Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) :=
P
(x,y, )2X⇥X⇥  µ⌧c,⌧ 0d(x, y,  )L(x, y,  ). I.e.,
Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) is the expected value of the probability that a type ⌧ individual who chooses c and observes a type
⌧ 0 individual who chooses d, switches from c to d.
Definition 1 A decision rule L is payoﬀ-ordering if for any two diﬀerent actions c and d, if ⇡⌧d > (<) ⇡⌧c,
then Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) > (<) 12 for all ⌧, ⌧
0 2 T and probability mass function µ⌧c,⌧ 0d : X⇥X⇥ ! [0, 1], with arbitrary
finite sets X ⇢ [0, 1] and   ⇢ [ 1, 1].11
Proposition 1 L is payoﬀ-ordering if and only if L(x, y,  ) = 12 +  (y +     x), with   2 (0, 1/4] for all
x, y 2 [0, 1], and   2 [ 1, 1].12
10Given that we introduce comparison signals, calling our decision rule a model of imitation might be a bit controversial. We
follow this convention because the most related models in the literature are usually called imitation models (see, e.g., Alos-Ferrer
and Schlag 2009).
11The assumption that the comparison signal is unbiased is still imposed here and throughout the paper, except in Appendix F,
where we study the eﬀect of abandoning it.
12Since y +     x 2 [ 2, 2], we need   2 (0, 1/4] so that the probabilities of switching are specified in [0, 1]. In general, when
(y +     x) 2 [ c, c], with c > 0, we need   2  0, 12c⇤. Here c = 2, but, for instance, the assumptions we make in the application
of Section 5 yield a diﬀerent value for c.
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The proof for the ‘if’ statement is instructive and is provided here. The argument for the ‘only if’ part is
provided in Appendix A.
Proof. For any ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T , and d 6= c 2 S,
Lcd(⌧, ⌧
0) =
X
(x,y, )2X2⇥ 
µ⌧c,⌧ 0d(x, y,  )
✓
1
2
+  (y +     x)
◆
=
1
2
+  (⇡⌧ 0d + ⇡⌧d   ⇡⌧ 0d   ⇡⌧c)
=
1
2
+  (⇡⌧d   ⇡⌧c).
Therefore, if ⇡⌧d > ⇡⌧c, then Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) > 1/2.
From now on, unless stated otherwise, we assume that decision rules are payoﬀ-ordering. Since the compar-
ison signal is unbiased, y +   is an unbiased estimator of the expected payoﬀ of individual i if she chooses the
action of the sampled individual j. Therefore, y+   x is an unbiased estimator of the diﬀerence between the
expected payoﬀ of d and c for individual i. Hence, since   > 0, in expected value, the probability of choosing
the action that provides her the greatest expected payoﬀ is greater than the probability of choosing the action
that provides her the smallest expected payoﬀ. Notice also that since   2  0, 14⇤ and ⇡⌧d   ⇡⌧c  1, by the
proof of Proposition 1, Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) 2
 
1
2 ,
3
4
⇤
when ⇡⌧d > ⇡⌧c and Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) 2
⇥
1
4 ,
1
2
⇤
otherwise.
Previous work on imitation in homogeneous populations focuses on either exogenously given rules or decision
rules that have been shown to satisfy some desirable properties. For instance, Schlag (1998) studies improving
rules, which satisfy that the population’s average expected payoﬀ is expected to be non-decreasing in time. It
is easy to show that in our model, heterogeneity rules out this possibility. It would also be desirable for the
decision rule to guarantee that individuals not only would be more likely to choose their optimal action, but also
that they do so with high probability. Unfortunately, this is not possible in our model. Indeed, from the proof
of Proposition 1 we have that for every decision rule, the expected value of the updated probability of choosing
the action with the highest payoﬀ of two observed actions is arbitrarily close to one half for some probability
mass functions µ⌧c,⌧ 0d. The expected probability of choosing the optimal action for any environment depends
on the value of  . This probability is maximized at   = 1/4, yet the subsequent analysis is valid for all
  2 (0, 1/4].13
13It may seem unintuitive that a payoﬀ-ordering decision rule prescribes switching with positive probability even if the observed
action earned a lower perceived payoﬀ than the own action. Changing this feature of the decision rule, however, would not
allow payoﬀ-ordering as the decision would necessarily have to be non-linear in observed payoﬀs and then the construction in the
argument of suﬃciency of the proof of Proposition 1 would not go through. To illustrate, consider an environment in which c gives
a payoﬀ of 0.1 to type A individuals with certainty, d gives a payoﬀ of 0 with certainty for type B individuals and the comparison
signal observed by type A individuals observing type B individuals choosing d is equal to 0 with probability 4/5 and 0.9 with
probability 1/5. In this case ⇡Ad > ⇡Ac. Nevertheless, a decision rule that never switches if the observed action’s perceived payoﬀ
is lower than the own would require a type A individual to stick with c with probability 4/5 when observing a type B individual
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Finally, we notice that observing comparison signals allows individuals to make choices that, in expected
value, do not depend on the observed individual’s type and depend only on his choice. This result follows from
the assumption that the comparison signal is unbiased; the formal argument for its proof follows directly from
the proof of suﬃciency in Proposition 1, and it is omitted.
Remark 1 If L is payoﬀ-ordering, then Lcd(⌧, ⌧) = Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) for all ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T and diﬀerent actions c, d 2 S.
Hence, for any payoﬀ-ordering decision rule we define Lcd(⌧) := Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) for any diﬀerent actions c, d 2 S
and ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T .
Individual state update. As mentioned above, each individual reviews her choice at points in time
determined by the intensities, i.e., the probability of sampling an individual of each state   2 ⌃.14 We assume
that, upon sampling, an individual whose state is   = (⌧, c, x,  A,  B) and samples an individual with state
 0 = (⌧ 0, c0, x0,  0A,  
0
B) updates her state to  00 = (⌧ 00, c00, x00,  00A,  00B) with probability &  0( 00), given by
&  0( 
00) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
µ⌧c(x00)µ⌧Ad( 00A)µ⌧Bd( 
00
B) if c = c0 = c00 and ⌧ 00 = ⌧
L(x, x0,  ⌧ 0)µ⌧c0(x00)µ⌧Ac( 00A)µ⌧Bc( 
00
B) if c00 = c0 6= c and ⌧ 00 = ⌧
(1  L(x, x0,  ⌧ 0))µ⌧c(x00)µ⌧Ac0( 00A)µ⌧Bc0( 00B) if c00 = c 6= c0 and ⌧ 00 = ⌧
0 otherwise,
(1)
where d 6= c. This assumption eﬀectively imposes independence between an individual’s payoﬀ and the com-
parison signal she observes the next time she reviews her action.
3 Population dynamics
In this section we analyze the dynamics of choices when individuals choose according to a payoﬀ-ordering
decision rule. The aim is to use a continuum population as an approximation of what would happen in an
economy populated by such a large population that the eﬀect of idiosyncratic shocks vanishes by virtue of the
Law of Large numbers. In particular, we apply results in Duﬃe, Qiao and Sun (2016) (see also Sun 2006 and
Duﬃe and Sun 2007 and 2012) to construct a dynamical system in which an Exact Law of Large numbers can
be applied so that the fractions of the populations of each type choosing each action are those corresponding
to the dynamics of their expected values. The formal derivation of this dynamical system is provided in
who chose d.
14Similarly, the standard approach in the literature assumes that action revision times are determined according to an indepen-
dent Poisson distribution. See, e.g., Sandholm (2010a, 2010b), and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2011) for further details.
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Appendix B.15
The model proceeds in continuous time. Each individual reviews her choice at points in time according to
the intensities and sampling procedures described in Section 2. Upon sampling, individuals update their state
according to (1). Our analysis is concerned with the fraction of type A individuals choosing a and the fraction
of type B individuals choosing b. These fractions follow a stochastic process fully determined by the sampling
and updating procedures described above. Since we assume a continuum population, our analysis focuses on
the deterministic path corresponding to the expected value of the stochastic process. Let p(t) be the fraction
of type A individuals choosing a and let q(t) be the fraction of type B individuals choosing b, for all t   0,
along this path. If the fraction of individuals whose state is   at time t is denoted by p (t) for all   2 ⌃ and
t 2 R+, we have that
↵p(t) =
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p (t) (2)
and
(1  ↵)q(t) =
X
 2⌃:⌧=B,c=b
p (t). (3)
Let  (⌃) be the set of all possible distributions of individual states at any point in time; that is,
 (⌃) :=
8<:p 2 R|⌃| : pk   0 for k = 1, 2, ..., |⌃| and
|⌃|X
k=1
pk = 1
9=; .
The initial fractions of the population in each individual state, denoted by (p (0)) 2⌃ 2  (⌃), are assumed
exogenously given. Yet, these initial conditions need to satisfy that the fractions of the population of type
A and B individuals are ↵ and 1   ↵, respectively; i.e., P 2⌃:⌧=A p (0) = ↵ and P 2⌃:⌧=B p (0) = 1   ↵.
Similarly, the initial fraction of type ⌧ individuals who choose action c and obtain a payoﬀ x (among all type
⌧ individuals who choose c) is assumed to be µ⌧c(x), for all ⌧ 2 T , c 2 S, and x 2 X; and the fraction of type
⌧ individuals who choose action c, sample a type ⌧ 0 individual who chooses d 6= c, and observe a comparison
signal  ⌧ 0 (among all type ⌧ individuals who choose c and sample a type ⌧ 0 individual who chooses d 6= c) is
µ⌧⌧ 0d( ⌧ 0), for all ⌧ 2 T , ⌧ 0 2 T , c 2 S, and  ⌧ 0 2  . The subset of  (⌃) that satisfies all these restrictions is
15There are measurability problems in invoking the law of large numbers for a continuum of random variables (see, e.g., Feldman
and Gilles 1985, Judd 1985, and Alos-Ferrer 2002). We thank Carlos Alos-Ferrer for pointing this out and providing us with these
references. In the last decade, a number of papers deal with this issue and with independent random matching in particular,
using Fubini Extensions introduced in Sun (2006) (see, e.g., Duﬃe and Sun 2007, 2012). See also Podczeck and Puzzello (2012),
who build on an earlier contribution by Alos-Ferrer (1999) to study independent random matching with a continuum of agents.
We thank three anonymous referees for guiding us to this literature. In particular, as mentioned above, the foundations for the
dynamical system analyzed here are an application of the results of Duﬃe, Qiao and Sun (2016). In a related environment,
with a diﬀerent approach, Benaim and Weibull (2003) show that the deterministic path of dynamical systems yield a reasonable
approximation of discrete time stochastic adjustment in large populations and over finite time horizons (see also Sandholm 2003
and Sandholm 2010a).
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denoted by  ˆ(⌃).
Fix the initial fractions of the population in each individual state at (p (0)) 2⌃ 2  ˆ(⌃). Then, the paths
p(t) and q(t), are given by the solution of the system of diﬀerential equations
↵p˙ = ↵(1  p) [↵p+ (1  ↵)(1  q)]Lba(A)  ↵p [↵(1  p) + (1  ↵)q]Lab(A) (4)
(1  ↵)q˙ = (1  ↵)(1  q) [(1  ↵)q + ↵(1  p)]Lab(B)  (1  ↵)q [(1  ↵)(1  q) + ↵p]Lba(B), (5)
with initial condition (p(0), q(0)) =
⇣
↵ 1
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a p (0), (1  ↵) 1
P
 2⌃:⌧=B,c=b p (0)
⌘
.16
The first term on the right-hand side of (4) gives the flow to action a of type A individuals. The mass of
type A individuals choosing b and sampling someone choosing a is given by ↵(1  p) [↵p+ (1  ↵)(1  q)] and
the rate at which these individuals switch is given by Lba(A). Similarly, the second term on the right-hand
side of (4) gives the flow to action b in the type A population. An analogous interpretation applies to (5).
We define p, q : R+ ! [0, 1] as the solutions of (4)-(5) (with exogenously given initial conditions (p (0)) 2⌃ 2
 ˆ(⌃)); most of the times, though, the time dependence of p(t) and q(t) will be omitted. Let U and D be
the expected value of the probability of switching to their optimal action for type A and type B individuals,
respectively, i.e., U := Lba(A) and D := Lab(B). From the proof of suﬃciency of Proposition 1, since the
diﬀerence of expected payoﬀs across actions is contained in [ 1, 1], we have U,D 2 (1/2, 3/4].17 Payoﬀ-
ordering decision rules satisfy Lab(⌧) = 1 Lba(⌧) for ⌧ 2 {A,B}, therefore the system of diﬀerential equations
(4)-(5) can be written as
p˙ = ↵p(1  p)(2U   1) + (1  ↵) [(1  p)(1  q)U   pq(1  U)] (6)
q˙ = (1  ↵)q(1  q)(2D   1) + ↵ [(1  q)(1  p)D   qp(1 D)] . (7)
In the sequel, it will often be convenient to work with the functions p˙, q˙ : [0, 1]2 ! R, with p˙(p, q) and q˙(p, q)
defined by the right hand sides of (6) and (7), respectively. Notice that p˙(p, q) is decreasing in q. As q increases
there are fewer type B individuals choosing a, therefore, when a type A individual samples a type B individual,
the probability that this individual has chosen b is greater. This makes it more likely for type A individuals
to choose b. The eﬀect of p on p˙ is ambiguous. In both heterogeneous and homogeneous populations, p˙
is a concave polynomial in p. In a homogeneous population, when p is very small there are too few type
16As in most of the equations below, the time dependence of p and q have been omitted.
17It may be thought that U and D being bounded away from 1 is a restrictive feature of the model. There is at least a couple of
alternative ways to avoid this. First, the distribution of the comparison signal could be allowed to depend on the payoﬀ realization
in such a manner that y+   x 2 [ 1, 1]. This would allow U,D 2 (1/2, 1]. Alternatively, as we discuss below, one could consider
decision rules which are not payoﬀ-ordering. The results of allowing U,D 2 (1/2, 1], however, are qualitatively similar to those of
our benchmark case.
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A individuals from whom to sample action a. On the other hand, when p is very large, just a few type A
individuals are left to switch from b to a. In a homogeneous population, as long as p 2 (0, 1), p˙ > 0. This
follows from the fact that, since U > 1/2, the flows from a to b are more than compensated by flows in the
opposite direction. In a heterogeneous (non-isolated) population, however, p 2 (0, 1) is compatible with p˙ < 0.
This occurs for high values of p at which an important fraction of type A individuals may be mislead when
sampling type B individuals choosing b which may cause p˙ < 0. An analogous reasoning applies to q˙ and (7).
Long run results. Let the set of rest points of the system (6)-(7) be denoted by
RP := {(p, q) 2 [0, 1]2 : p˙(p, q) = q˙(p, q) = 0}.
First we characterize RP . When all individuals choose the same action the system is in a rest point. Hence,
(0, 1) and (1, 0) are rest points and we refer to them as corner rest points. Our next result shows that for
some values of ↵, U, and D there is a third rest point located in (0, 1) 2. This interior rest point is given by
(bp, bq), with bp := U(↵(U +D   1)  (1  U)(2D   1))
↵(2U   1)(U +D   1)
and bq := D((1  ↵)(U +D   1)  (1 D)(2U   1))
(1  ↵)(2D   1)(U +D   1) ,
and it exists if and only if
↵ :=
(1  U)(2D   1)
U +D   1 < ↵ <
U(2D   1)
U +D   1 =: ↵.
Lemma 1 If ↵ 2 (↵,↵) , then RP = {(0, 1), (1, 0), (bp, bq)}, otherwise RP = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}.
In the proof of this lemma we use the functions q : [0, 1] ! R, defined by p˙(p, q(p)) = 0 for all p 2 [0, 1],
and p : [0, 1]! R, defined by q˙(p(q), q) = 0 for all q 2 [0, 1].
Proof. If p = 1, then p˙ = 0 if and only if q = 0. Correspondingly, if q = 1, then p˙ = 0 if and only if p = 0.
Hence, (1, 0) and (0, 1) are rest points.
From (6) and (7), the points (p, q) that satisfy p˙ = q˙ = 0 are those that satisfy both
q =
↵p(1  p)(2U   1) + (1  ↵)(1  p)U
(1  ↵)((1  p)U + p(1  U)) , (8)
p =
(1  ↵)q(1  q)(2D   1) + ↵(1  q)D
↵((1  q)D + q(1 D)) . (9)
Notice that q(p) and p(q) are given by the right-hand side of (8) and (9), respectively, and hence, their graphs
contain (0, 1) and (1, 0). The second derivative of q(p) is
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q00(p) =
2U(2U   1)(1  U)
(1  ↵)(p(2U   1)  U)3 ,
where the numerator is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly negative, because p  1 < U/(2U   1);
hence q is strictly concave. A similar calculation reveals that p is strictly concave as well. If (p, q) is a rest
point of the system, then p = p(q(p)) and q = q(p) (or equivalently, q = q(p(q)) and p = p(q)). Hence, for
(p, q) to be a rest point, p must satisfy
p(q(p)) =
(1  ↵)q(p)(1  q(p))(2D   1) + ↵(1  q(p))D
↵((1  q(p))D + q(p)(1 D)) = p.
This yields p = bp. For this to be a rest point not in {(0, 1), (1, 0)} we also need bp 2 (0, 1). The inequalitybp > 0 simplifies to ↵ > ↵ and bp < 1 simplifies to ↵ < ↵, i.e., bp 2 (0, 1) if and only if ↵ 2 (↵,↵). Further,
q(bp) = bq and bq 2 (0, 1) if and only if ↵ 2 (↵,↵). Hence, there is an interior rest point given by (bp, bq) if and
only if ↵ 2 (↵,↵).
We refer to corner rest points as uniform adoption and interior rest points as dual incomplete learning. Next
we analyze the conditions for the diﬀerent rest points to be stable. The notion of asymptotic stability that we
study requires the system to remain close and converge to the rest point whenever the system starts suﬃciently
close to it (e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). Formally a rest point (p⇤, q⇤) is asymptotically stable if (i) for any
" > 0 there exists some  1 2 (0, ") such that if ||(p(t), q(t)) (p⇤, q⇤)|| <  1, then ||(p(t0), q(t0)) (p⇤, q⇤)|| < " for
all t0 > t, and (ii) there exists some  2 > 0 such that if ||(p(t), q(t))  (p⇤, q⇤)|| <  2, then limt0!1(p(t0), q(t0)) =
(p⇤, q⇤).18
In the following theorem, we characterize the stability properties of the diﬀerent rest points of system (4)-
(5) for virtually all possible parameter values.19 Furthermore, we show that in each case, the asymptotically
stable rest point is a global attractor, i.e., the system converges to this point regardless of the initial conditions
(as long as the path does not start at a diﬀerent rest point). The theorem shows that, if the fraction of type
A individuals or the fraction of type B individuals is small enough, i.e., if ↵ < ↵ or ↵ > ↵, then we have
convergence to uniform adoption. Otherwise, we have convergence to dual incomplete learning. As explained
above, the cutoﬀs ↵ and ↵ are determined by the sensitivities of the decision problems of each type.20
18|| · || stands for the Euclidean norm.
19We only exclude ↵ = ↵ and ↵ = ↵, because the techniques that we use in the proof of the result applies only to hyperbolic
rest points (see the proof of Theorem 1) and at ↵ = ↵ and ↵ = ↵ some of the rest points are not hyperbolic.
20We cannot have complete learning for one type and partial learning for the other. E.g., we have no rest points (1, q) with
q > 0. Intuitively, since type A individuals occasionally observe action b in this point and switch with positive probability when
they do, they would move away from action a. Similarly, we have no rest points (p, 1) with p > 0.
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Theorem 1 Suppose ↵ 6= ↵ and ↵ 6= ↵. Then, the system (6)-(7) has a unique asymptotically stable point
given by
(p⇤, q⇤) =
8>>><>>>:
(0, 1) if ↵ < ↵
(pˆ, qˆ) if ↵ < ↵ < ↵
(1, 0) if ↵ > ↵.
Furthermore, in each of these cases limt!1(p(t), q(t)) = (p⇤, q⇤) for all paths such that (p(0), q(0)) /2 RP \
{(p⇤, q⇤)}.21
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix C. Intuitively, since individuals make decisions according
to a payoﬀ ordering decision rule, in each decision they are more likely to choose their optimal action. The
smaller the fraction of type A individuals in the population, however, the less likely it is to sample an individual
choosing a. This leads action a to propagate less and eventually the whole population converges to choose
b. Analogously, when the fraction of type A individuals in the population is large enough, a propagates more
than b, and eventually, the whole population ends up choosing a. Finally, if the fraction of the population of
type A is neither large enough nor small enough, both actions propagate in a more balanced manner and the
system converges to an interior asymptotically stable rest point.
The fact that we do not have eﬃciency in the long run, i.e., that (p, q) does not converge to (1, 1) is a
robust phenomenon that does not rely on the linearity of payoﬀ-ordering decision rules. To see this, notice
that for an arbitrary decision rule L, system (4)-(5) at (p, q) = (1, 1) yields p˙ =  (1   ↵)Lab(A,B) and
q˙ =  ↵Lba(B,A). Hence, unless switching to the sub-optimal action occurs with probability zero for both
types, i.e., Lab(A,B) = Lba(B,A) = 0, the system cannot converge to (1, 1) if it starts elsewhere. The
conditions Lab(A,B) = Lba(B,A) = 0 are fairly restrictive, however, as they require the decision maker never
to switch in any event of realizations of observed payoﬀs and comparison signal, when she chose her optimal
action.22
Dynamics of the system. We illustrate the dynamics of the system in the phase diagrams displayed in
Figure 1. The isoclines correspond to the graphs of the functions p and q. The left, center and right panels
correspond to the cases ↵ < ↵, ↵ < ↵ < ↵, and ↵ < ↵, respectively. As illustrated in Figure 1, the distinctive
feature of each of these cases is that p is above q, p and q intersect, and p is below q, respectively.
21Whenever a rest point is a global attractor, it satisfies the second condition of asymptotic stability. In general, however, it
does not necessarily satisfy the first part, i.e., it is possible that the dynamics move away from the rest point before eventually
converging to it. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 reveals that a rest point of (6)-(7) is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a global
attractor of the system.
22There are, however, examples of decision rules and environments such that these conditions are met. For instance, consider
decision rules such as a suitably modified version of “imitate if better” (see, e.g., Oyarzun and Ruf 2009), in which individuals
switch (corresp. do not switch) with probability 1 if y +   > x (corresp. y +   < x), and randomize with a fair coin, otherwise.
This decision rule yields Lab(A,B) = Lba(B,A) = 0 in the environment such that ⇡Aa = ⇡Bb = 1, ⇡Ab = ⇡Ba = 0, and the
comparison signals within individuals of the same type (for all actions) are deterministic.
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Figure 1. The solid and dashed lines represent p and q, respectively. U = D = 3/4 (↵= 1/4 and ↵= 3/4) and
↵= 9/40, 1/2, and 31/40 in the left, center, and right panel, respectively.
Let us provide some intuition for why we obtain such patterns in the dynamics of the system. For concrete-
ness, we focus on the case in which both p(0) and q(0) are small and the population converge to choose b (the
left panel of Figure 1). When both p and q are initially small, there is a large amount of individuals in each
type that are subject to switch to their respective optimal action. Further, whenever an individual samples an
individual from the opposite type she is likely to sample her own optimal action. Thus, initially learning occurs
for both types of individuals in the sense that both p and q increase. In a homogeneous population imitation
would continue and the whole population would converge to choose the unique optimal action. In our model,
however, (p, q) eventually reaches a point above the isocline p˙ = 0 and when this happens p starts to decrease.
At this point the measure of type A individuals who are subject to switch to a and the measure of type B
individuals from whom a can be sampled are both smaller than at the beginning, reversing the increase in p.
The decrease in p benefits type B, who become more likely to sample b from type A. This sets q on a positive
trend, which in turn accelerates the decrease in p. The result is a dynamic in which the fraction of type A
individuals choosing a decreases until it converges to zero, while the fraction of type B individuals choosing b
converges monotonically to one. The analysis of the other cases is similar and is left for the reader.
The model predicts convergence to a corner rest point for a large set of parameter values. Therefore,
in our model, when the sensitivities of the problems are relatively similar, imitation within a heterogeneous
population may not result in optimality for minorities. This contrasts sharply with findings for homogeneous
populations, where such adverse eﬀects cannot arise (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg 1995, Schlag 1998). The
adverse eﬀect for the minority is related to the fact that its optimal action eventually becomes diﬃcult to
sample. The sampling procedure creates a bias toward actions that are more popular, in the sense that a larger
fraction of the population is choosing them. This contrasts with the manner in which Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993) introduce popularity, in which they assume that when individuals make choices, they are biased toward
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more popular actions. In our analysis, there is no exogenously imposed bias toward more popular actions. As
in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), this bias instead arises endogenously as a result of the sampling procedure.
Comparative statics: the role of sensitivity and size. Here we analyze the impact of ↵, U , and D
on the predictions of the model. Recall that U and D are determined by the diﬀerence in the expected payoﬀ
across actions for type A and type B individuals, respectively. Hence, the eﬀect of U and D on the long run
outcomes reflects the impact of the sensitivity of the decision problems. Abusing notation, let the functions
↵ : (1/2, 3/4]2 ! R and ↵ : (1/2, 3/4]2 ! R be defined by ↵(U,D) = (1 U)(2D 1)U+D 1 and ↵(U,D) = U(2D 1)U+D 1 ,
respectively, for all (U,D) 2 (1/2, 3/4]2. An interior rest point exists whenever ↵(U,D) < ↵ < ↵(U,D). Let
↵i and ↵i denote the first derivative of ↵ and ↵, respectively, with respect to i = U,D.We obtain ↵U(U,D) < 0
and ↵U(U,D) < 0. Thus for greater values of U the population converge to choose b for a smaller set of values
of ↵ and a for a larger set of values of ↵. Similarly ↵D(U,D) > 0 and ↵D(U,D) > 0.
Notice also that lim
D!1/2
↵(U,D) = lim
D!1/2
↵(U,D) = 0 and lim
U!1/2
↵(U,D) = lim
U!1/2
↵(U,D) = 1. This implies
that for small enough D (and for fixed ↵ and U) the population converges to choose a, whereas for small
enough U (and for fixed ↵ and D) the population converges to choose b. Hence, if the majority is close to
indiﬀerent between a and b, but the minority is not, the population converges to choose the minority’s optimal
action. On the other hand, since ↵(U,D),↵(U,D) 2 (0, 1), for any U,D there exist some ↵ such that the
population converge to choose either a or b. This means that even if, for example, type A individuals are close
to indiﬀerent between a and b, if type A is suﬃciently large, the population converge to choose a.
Let (pˆ(U,D,↵),qˆ(U,D,↵)) be the interior rest point expressed as a function of the parameters of the model.
Then, for ↵ 2 (↵(U,D),↵(U,D)) we obtain bpU > 0, bpD < 0, and bp↵ > 0, where bpi, denote the first derivative of
pˆ(U,D,↵) with respect to i, for i = U,D,↵. Hence, the fraction of type A individuals choosing their optimal
action in an interior rest point increases in type A’s sensitivity and size and decreases in type B’s sensitivity.
In the interior rest point, p˙(p, q) is decreasing in p. As p˙(p, q) is increasing in U, when U increases, the isocline
p˙(p, q) = 0 moves to the right which results in higher value of p in equilibrium. A similar argument reveals
why bp is increasing in ↵ and decreasing in D.
Homogeneous sensitivities. It is instructive to look at the case where the sensitivity of the problems of
both types of individuals is the same. In the special case U = D and ↵ = 1/2 we obtain bp = bq = U . Let us
briefly look at why this is the case. If p = q = U , then the probability of sampling either action is equal to 1/2.
The flow towards a among type A individuals is therefore 12(1   p)U = 12(1   U)U and the flow towards b in
A is 12p(1  U) = 12U(1  U). Hence, switching towards and switching away from a among type A individuals
are balanced.
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More generally, if U = D, we have that ↵ = 1  U , ↵ = U , and bp = U2U 1 U (1 ↵)↵ and bq = U2U 1 U ↵1 ↵ for all
↵ 2 (1   U,U). This implies that ↵bp = U U (1 ↵)2U 1 and (1   ↵)bq = U U ↵2U 1 . Hence, ↵bp + (1   ↵)bq = U , so the
total fraction of individuals in the population choosing their optimal action in the interior rest point is equal
to the common sensitivity of both types. In the corner equilibria, however, when ↵ /2 (1  U,U), the fraction
of the population choosing their optimal action is greater than U .
Non payoﬀ-ordering decision rules. We now turn our attention to the impact of assuming that
individuals follow payoﬀ-ordering decision rules. Alternatively, we could consider decision rules such as the
version of “imitate if better” described in footnote 22. It is easy to construct environments such that U,D 2
(3/4, 1) for this decision rule. This yields results qualitatively similar to those provided above. More possibilities
arise when U and D can be less than 1/2, which can also occur in some environments for this decision rule.
If U  1/2 and D > 1/2, then the population converge to choose b for all ↵ 2 (0, 1), and hence, as with
payoﬀ-ordering decision rules, we obtain uniform adoption. A diﬀerent result, however, can be obtained if both
U,D < 1/2. Then, for a range of values of ↵, an interior equilibrium may exist in which both p⇤, q⇤ < 1/2.
A decision rule yielding U,D < 1/2, however, would certainly be very unappealing. In summary, assuming
payoﬀ-ordering we rule out U,D < 1/2 and thus, that both types of individuals do worse in the long run than
with simple random choice.
Average expected payoﬀ of the population. If individuals were to randomize uniformly between the
two actions, then, on average, half of the individuals of each type would choose their optimal action. We say
that imitation is detrimental for a type of individuals whenever less than half of them choose their optimal
action asymptotically. The imitation process is detrimental for one of the types when the asymptotically
stable rest point is either (0, 1) or (1, 0). At an interior rest point, imitation is detrimental for at most one
type: since q(0) = 1 and q(1) = 0, and q(p) is strictly concave, we have q(p) > 1 p for all p 2 (0, 1); therefore,
pˆ+ qˆ > 1. If there is a type for which imitation is detrimental, however, this type represents a small fraction
of the population or has the decision problem with the smallest sensitivity. It turns out that the gains over
random choice of the type that benefits from imitation always exceed the losses incurred by the type for whom
imitation is detrimental, if any. The average expected payoﬀ of the population in the state (p, q), denoted by
W I(p, q), is given by
W I(p, q) = ↵(p⇡Aa + (1  p)⇡Ab) + (1  ↵)(q⇡Bb + (1  q)⇡Ba).
The average expected payoﬀ of the population when all individuals choose randomly with uniform probability,
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denoted by WRC , is given by
WRC =
1
2
(↵(⇡Aa + ⇡Ab) + (1  ↵)(⇡Bb + ⇡Ba)).
Remark 2 W I(p⇤, q⇤) > WRC for any asymptotically stable rest point (p⇤, q⇤) of (4)-(5).
Proof. First, consider ↵ > ↵. Then (p⇤, q⇤) = (1, 0) and
W I(1, 0) WRC = 1
2
(↵(⇡Aa   ⇡Ab)  (1  ↵)(⇡Bb   ⇡Ba)) = 1
4 
(↵(2U   1)  (1  ↵)(2D   1)),
which implies that W I(1, 0)  WRC > 0 if ↵ > 2D 12(U+D) ; and this holds, because 2D 12(U+D) < ↵. An analogous
argument holds if ↵ < ↵. Suppose ↵ 2 (↵,↵). For simplicity assume   = 14 (a similar argument holds if
  2 (0, 14)). Then
W I(pˆ, qˆ) WRC = ↵
✓
pˆ  1
2
◆
(⇡Aa   ⇡Ab) + (1  ↵)
✓
qˆ   1
2
◆
(⇡Bb   ⇡Ba) = (2D   1)(2U   1) > 0.
4 Biased sampling
In this section we allow for homophily (bias towards sampling same type individuals) and heterophily (bias
towards sampling other type individuals). Homophilic tendencies are widely documented in the social networks
literature (see Currarini, Jackson and Pin 2009 and references therein), and may be due to segregation or
individuals’ preferences for having friends that are similar to them.
We introduce homophily and heterophily in our model using the parameters ↵A 2 (0, 1) and ↵B 2 (0, 1),
which correspond to the the relative intensities with which type A individuals sample a type A individual and
type B individuals sample a type B individual, respectively. In the benchmark case analyzed above, ↵A = ↵
and ↵B = 1  ↵; here, if ↵A > (<)↵, then type A individuals are homophilous (heterophilous); and similarly,
if ↵B > (<)1  ↵ then type B individuals are homophilous (heterophilous).
General intensities. In order to accommodate biased sampling we need to generalize the benchmark
model allowing the sampling intensities to diﬀer from the fraction of the population in each state. We refer
to this case as the model with general intensities. In particular, we define the function ✓  0 :  (⌃) ! [0, 1],
where ✓  0((p 00) 002⌃) is the intensity with which a state   individual samples a state  0 individual when the
cross-sectional distribution of individual states is (p 00) 002⌃, for all  ,  0 2 ⌃.
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Mass-balancing condition. Since our analysis requires that individuals sample each other, our model
needs to satisfy the mass-balancing condition
p ✓  0((p 00) 002⌃) = p 0✓ 0 ((p 00) 002⌃),
for all (p 00) 002⌃ 2  (⌃) and  ,  0 2 ⌃. The mass-balancing condition is satisfied automatically in the bench-
mark model analyzed above, because there we assume that intensities are equal to the fraction of individuals in
that individual state within the population; i.e., ✓  0((p 00) 002⌃) = p 0 , for all (p 00) 002⌃ 2  (⌃) and  ,  0 2 ⌃.23
However, the mass-balancing condition does not hold in general in the model with general intensities. The
construction provided here tackles this problem by introducing an additional variable in the individual state.
This binary variable represents a dummy-sampling type, which allows some individuals to sample without
changing their actions (that is, these individuals are only observed by other individuals). Thus, by introducing
dummy-sampling types, we are able to satisfy the mass-balancing condition while at the same time eﬀectively
generate biased sampling.
Individual states. We extend the definition of individual states including the binary variable ✏ 2 {0, 1};
thus, we now consider individual states   := (⌧, c, x,  A,  B, ✏) 2 T ⇥ S ⇥ X ⇥  2 ⇥ {0, 1}. Sampling aﬀects
an individual, in the sense that she will update her choice according to the decision rule L (provided that the
observed action is diﬀerent from hers), only if her state features ✏ = 1.
Individual state changes. If the individual state   is such that ✏ = 0, then type ⌧ and action c remain the
same upon sampling and the new state is (⌧, c, x00,  00A,  00B, ✏00) with probability µ⌧c(x00)µ⌧Ad( 00A)µ⌧Bd( 00B)µ✏⌧ (✏00),
where µ✏⌧ (✏00) is a constant in [0, 1] for ⌧ 2 {A,B} and ✏00 2 {0, 1}. Otherwise, if ✏ = 1, an individual whose
state is   = (⌧, c, x,  A,  B, ✏) and has sampled an individual with state  0 = (⌧ 0, c0, x0,  0A,  0B, ✏0) updates her
state to  00 = (⌧ 00, c00, x00,  00A,  00B, ✏00) with probability &  0( 00), given by
&  0( 
00) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
µ⌧c(x00)µ⌧Ad( 00A)µ⌧Bd( 
00
B)µ✏⌧ (✏
00) if c = c0 = c00 and ⌧ 00 = ⌧
L(x, x0,  ⌧ 0)µ⌧c0(x00)µ⌧Ac( 00A)µ⌧Bc( 
00
B)µ✏⌧ (✏
00) if c00 = c0 6= c and ⌧ 00 = ⌧
(1  L(x, x0,  ⌧ 0))µ⌧c(x00)µ⌧Ac0( 00A)µ⌧Bc0( 00B)µ✏⌧ (✏00) if c00 = c 6= c0 and ⌧ 00 = ⌧
0 otherwise,
where d 6= c. In order to have mass-balance, if ↵(1   ↵A) < (1   ↵)(1   ↵B), then type A individuals are
required to have dummy-samples, whereas if ↵(1 ↵A) > (1 ↵)(1 ↵B), then type B individuals are required
23And this condition does play a role in the analysis, because the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix B uses Corollaries 1 and
2 in Duﬃe, Qiao and Sun (2016), which assume that the mass-balancing condition holds.
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to have dummy-samples. Hence, we set
µ✏A(1) = min
⇢
1,
↵(1  ↵A)
(1  ↵)(1  ↵B)
 
= 1  µ✏A(0)
µ✏B(1) = min
⇢
1,
(1  ↵)(1  ↵B)
↵(1  ↵A)
 
= 1  µ✏B(0).
Intensities. We set the intensities to
✓  0((p 00) 002⌃) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1
µ✏A (1)
↵A↵ 1p 0 if ⌧ = ⌧ 0 = A
1
µ✏A (1)
(1  ↵A)(1  ↵) 1p 0 if ⌧ = A and ⌧ 0 = B
1
µ✏B (1)
(1  ↵B)↵ 1p 0 if ⌧ = B and ⌧ 0 = A
1
µ✏B (1)
↵B(1  ↵) 1p 0 if ⌧ = ⌧ 0 = B,
for all (p 00) 002⌃ 2  (⌃). Thus, the model satisfies the mass-balancing condition.
The diﬀerential equations, analogous to (4)-(5), that drive the dynamical system in presence of homophily
and/or heterophily are24
↵p˙ = ↵(1  p) [↵Ap+ (1  ↵A)(1  q)]Lba(A)  ↵p [↵A(1  p) + (1  ↵A)q]Lab(A) (10)
(1  ↵)q˙ = (1  ↵)(1  q) [↵Bq + (1  ↵B)(1  p)]Lab(B)  (1  ↵)q [↵B(1  q) + (1  ↵B)p]Lba(B).(11)
In Subsection 10.1 of Appendix D we explain how to derive these diﬀerential equations. We now provide the
analysis of the dynamics implied by this system.
Stable Equilibria. The resulting dynamics are qualitatively similar to the case of uniform sampling, yet
the analysis allows us to obtain insights about the eﬀect of these biases on the population’s choices. As before,
we obtain convergence to either a corner rest point or a unique interior rest point. We also obtain some results,
however, that cannot arise under uniform sampling. The corner rest point that is non-optimal for a type of
individuals can be ruled out if this type is suﬃciently homophilous. More generally, the fraction of both types
of individuals choosing a (corresp. b) increases in ↵A (corresp. ↵B). This means that a type benefits from
being more homophilous and is aﬀected negatively by the homophily of the other type. In the limit, as ↵A
and ↵B go to one, so each type is completely homophilous, the global attractor of the system approaches (1, 1),
i.e., the entire population makes the right choice. Hence, the limit of the model when ↵A and ↵B go to one
corresponds to the case of two homogeneous populations.
24In formal terms, Proposition 4 of Appendix B holds in the model with general intensities as well (with the natural necessary
adjustment to the definition of  ˆ(⌃) to accommodate for the dummy-sampling variable in the individual state).
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Formally, fix U,D 2 (12 , 34 ], and define the functions ↵A : R! R and ↵B : R! R such that
↵A(z) =
D   U + zD(2U   1)
(1  U)(2D   1) and ↵B(z) =
U  D + zU(2D   1)
(1 D)(2U   1) ,
respectively, for all z 2 R. It is easy to see that ↵A >
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
, and ↵A < (>)
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B) if and only if
↵B > (<)↵B(↵A), where
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
is the inverse function of ↵B. The following lemma characterizes virtually
all the pairs (↵A,↵B) such that (1, 0) is asymptotically stable and such that (0, 1) is asymptotically stable.25
Appendix D contains all proofs of this section.
Lemma 2 Suppose ↵A 6= ↵A(↵B) and ↵B 6= ↵B(↵A). Then, (i) (1, 0) is asymptotically stable if and only
if ↵A > ↵A(↵B), (ii) (0, 1) is asymptotically stable if and only if ↵A <
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B), and (iii) if (1, 0) is
asymptotically stable, then (0, 1) is not asymptotically stable (and vice versa).
Corollary 1 (i) If ↵B > 1 DD , then (1, 0) is not asymptotically stable, and if U > D and ↵B <
U D
U(2U 1) , then
(1, 0) is asymptotically stable. (ii) If ↵A > 1 UU , then (0, 1) is not asymptotically stable, and if D > U and
↵A <
D U
U(2D 1) , then (0, 1) is asymptotically stable.
Lemma 2 implies that for any U,D 2 (12 , 34 ] and ↵A,↵B 2 (0, 1) either (i) (1, 0) is asymptotically stable,
(ii) (0, 1) is asymptotically stable, or (iii) neither (1, 0) nor (0, 1) is asymptotically stable. For large values
of ↵A relative to ↵B, (1, 0) is asymptotically stable, whereas for large values of ↵B relative to ↵A, (0, 1) is
asymptotically stable. For more similar values of ↵A and ↵B, neither (1, 0), nor (0, 1) is asymptotically
stable. This is illustrated in Figure 2 for U = 0.7 and D = 0.65. The northwest (corresp. southeast) region
corresponds to the parameter values such that (1, 0) (corresp. (0, 1)) is asymptotically stable. In the center
region neither (1, 0), nor (0, 1) is asymptotically stable. Our next result reveals that there is a unique interior
rest point if and only if (↵A,↵B) is in the center region of Figure 2.
25The only possibilities we do not consider here are when ↵A = ↵A(↵B) or ↵B = ↵B(↵A), in which case some rest points may
not be hyperbolic and hence may not be determined using the Jacobian of the system.
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Figure 2. U = 0.7 and D = 0.65. The solid line is ↵A and the dashed line
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
.
Lemma 3 (i) If ↵A <
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B) or ↵A > ↵A(↵B), then there is no interior rest point. (ii) If
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B) <
↵A < ↵A(↵B), then there is a unique interior rest point.
Lemmas 2 and 3 establish that, setting aside the cases where rest points may not be hyperbolic, i.e.,
↵A = ↵A(↵B) and ↵B = ↵B(↵A), there is an interior rest point if and only if neither (1, 0) nor (0, 1) is
asymptotically stable. The closed-form expression describing the interior rest point, denoted by (ep, eq), is
cumbersome and it is provided in Lemma 8 of Appendix D. The following result provides the global attractors
of the system for virtually all the possible values of ↵ and ↵B.
Proposition 2 If (p(0), q(0)) /2 RP, then
lim
t!1
(p(t), q(t)) =
8>>><>>>:
(0, 1) if ↵A <
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B)
(ep, eq) if ⇥↵ 1B ⇤ (↵B) < ↵A < ↵A(↵B)
(1, 0) if ↵A(↵B) < ↵A.
We shall emphasize two implications of the results above. First, together with Corollary 1, Proposition 2
implies that if a given type is suﬃciently homophilous, then the population will not converge to choose that
type’s non-optimal action. For example, if ↵B > 1 DD then the system will not converge to (1, 0) regardless of
↵A and U . An implication is that if both types are suﬃciently homophilous, then the population converges
to an interior rest point. Second, if U > D and additionally type B is relatively small or heterophilous, so
that ↵B is below a threshold value (determined by U and D), then the whole population converges to action a,
regardless of ↵A. These observations are illustrated in Figure 2, where U > D. Here if ↵B > 0.54, then there
is no ↵A such that the population converges to choose a. On the other hand if ↵B < 0.19, then the population
converges to action a even if ↵A is arbitrarily small.26
26An implication of this result is that uniform adoption does not require uniform sampling. Furthermore, both types being
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Comparative Statics. The fraction of a type that chooses its optimal action in an interior rest point
increases in that type’s homophily. Fix U,D 2  12 , 34⇤ and let (ep(↵A,↵B), eq(↵A,↵B)) be the interior rest point,
when it exists, as a function of ↵A and ↵B. We obtain that the partial derivatives of these functions satisfyep1(↵A,↵B) > 0, ep2(↵A,↵B) < 0, eq1(↵A,↵B) < 0 and eq2(↵A,↵B) > 0 (see Appendix D). Intuitively, interior rest
points are determined by the balance of flows into and out of each action for each type. When sampling is
uniform, interior rest points (p⇤, q⇤) satisfy p⇤ > 1 q⇤. Hence in equilibrium, a greater probability of sampling
individuals of the same type makes it more likely for an individual to sample her optimal action. This allows
a larger fraction of this type of individuals to choose their optimal action, as they are less exposed to the
possibility of sampling an individual of the other type choosing the other action.
Finally, from the results above, the system cannot converge to (1, 0) when ↵B > 1 DD . The following remark,
however, reveals that ep can be arbitrarily close to 1, even if ↵B > 1 DD , provided that type A individuals
are suﬃciently homophilous. This result also implies that in the limit, as each type becomes completely
homophilous, a heterogeneous population behaves as two homogenous populations.
Remark 3 If ↵B > 1 DD , then lim↵A!1
ep(↵A,↵B) = 1 and if ↵A > 1 UU , then lim↵B!1eq(↵A,↵B) = 1.
5 A monopolist with heterogeneous consumers
In this section we consider a monopolist who serves a market of boundedly rational consumers with heteroge-
neous valuations for his product. We assume that the expected valuation of the product is positive for some
consumers and zero for others. The two possible choices for consumers are buying or not buying the product.
The monopolist knows the expected value of the valuation and the size of each type. Furthermore, he knows
that consumers are boundedly rational and their decision rules. The valuation of each individual consumer,
however, is unknown to both the monopolist and the consumer.
Consumers’ decisions. To fix ideas, suppose the population consists of individuals that suﬀer from
a chronic illness that produces unpleasant symptoms. The monopolist provides the only available treatment.
Symptoms present themselves randomly and translate into physical payoﬀs, measured in monetary units, which
take values within a finite set whose minimum is 0.5 and maximum is 1.27 The outcomes 0.5 and 1 can be
thought of as the physical payoﬀ of “full symptoms” and “no symptoms,” respectively. The expected physical
heavily biased toward sampling individuals of their own type is not incompatible with uniform adoption. For instance, in Figure 2,
we just require ↵B < 0.19 for uniform adoption of a to occur for any ↵A. More broadly, if we measure type B individuals’ bias to
sample their own type by  B := ↵B(1  ↵) 1, it is easy to see that we can have uniform adoption even if  B is very high: if we
fix  B , for suﬃciently small (1  ↵) one obtains that  B(1  ↵) < 0.54 and hence, uniform adoption of a (for high enough ↵A).
27We normalize the physical payoﬀs to be in [0.5, 1] so that the total payoﬀ of each choice, corresponding to the physical payoﬀs
minus the price charged by the monopolist, fall in [0, 1], as in the benchmark model.
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payoﬀ of an untreated individual is   < 1. The treatment of the monopolist is eﬀective for type A individuals
but has no eﬀect on type B individuals. The expected physical payoﬀ of a type A individual under treatment
is  0 2 ( , 1]. Therefore, ' :=  0     > 0 measures the expected eﬀectiveness of the treatment for type A
individuals. The expected physical payoﬀ of a type B individual under treatment is  .28 Individuals choose
whether to buy the treatment from the monopolist (action a) or buy no treatment (action b). The monopolist
sells the treatment at price r 2 [0,'] to both type A and type B individuals.29 Each individual’s payoﬀ is
equal to her physical payoﬀ minus the price paid to the monopolist. Hence, individuals’ payoﬀ fall in [0, 1].
Expected payoﬀs are, thus, given by ⇡Aa =  0   r, ⇡Ab =  , ⇡Ba =     r and ⇡Bb =  .
As before, each individual makes choices after observing her own payoﬀ, that of another individual, and a
comparison signal. We assume that the price the monopolist charges is observed and individuals know that
they are all charged the same price if they buy the treatment. Therefore, the comparison signal is informative
only about the diﬀerence in expected physical payoﬀs under the observed individual’s choice.30 Formally, the
expected values of the comparison signals are ⇡ABa =  0   , ⇡BAa =     0, ⇡AAa = 0, ⇡BBa = 0, and ⇡⌧⌧ 0b = 0
for ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 {A,B}. In order to make the interpretation of the comparison-signal consistent with previous
sections, and since physical payoﬀs are contained in [0.5, 1], we restrict the finite set of comparison-signals
to have minimum  0.5 and maximum 0.5. The individuals’ decision rule is L(x, y,  ) = 12 +  (y +     x)
as before. Since here min(x,y, )2X2⇥  {y +     x}    1.5 and max(x,y, )2X2⇥  {y +     x}  1.5, we can now
choose   from (0, 1/3].31 For simplicity we assume   = 1/3 and obtain Lba(A) = 12 +
1
3('  r) =: bU(', r) and
Lab(B) =
1
2 +
1
3r =:
bD(', r). Hence, Lba(A), Lab(B) 2 ⇥12 , 23⇤.
The demand curve. We assume that the monopolist fully understands how individuals make choices,
although he does not know the type of each individual or the realizations of payoﬀs and comparison signals.
We also assume that the monopolist chooses a fixed price that maximizes his profit in the asymptotically stable
28Our model is related to Spiegler’s (2006) model of markets for “quacks.” In his paper the treatment is ineﬀective for all
individuals in the population, so he refers to the healer as a quack. In our model the healer is not a quack since the treatment
works for some individuals, although it is ineﬀective for others.
29At prices above ', under full information, both type A and type B individuals prefer not to buy the treatment. In our setting,
such prices would lead the population to a state in which no individual buys the treatment. As we show below, prices larger than
' do not add anything to the analysis.
30For example, suppose the illness is chronic overweight and the treatment is an individualized diet prescribed by a nutritionist.
Whether the diet is eﬀective for weight control may depend, among other things, on individuals’ willpower. Such considerations
may lead an individual to see the nutritionist even after hearing about the negative experience of an undisciplined acquaintance,
if she believes herself to have more willpower than the acquaintance.
31From footnote 12, we need   2  0, 12c⇤ and here y +     x 2 [ c, c] = [ 1.5, 1.5].
23
rest point of the dynamic system (p⇤, q⇤).32 The monopolist, thus, faces a demand curve given by
Q(r) := ↵p⇤ + (1  ↵)(1  q⇤),
where (p⇤, q⇤), as explained below, is determined by r,', and ↵.
We can find the prices such that (p⇤, q⇤) = (1, 0) and (p⇤, q⇤) = (0, 1), respectively. In order to do this, we
need to find the values of r such that ↵(bU(', r), bD(', r)) = ↵ and ↵(bU(', r), bD(', r)) = ↵, respectively. We
denote these values by r(',↵) and r(',↵), respectively. Simple computations reveal that
r(',↵) =
1
4
(3 + 2' 
p
(3 + 2')2   24↵')
r(',↵) =
1
4
(2'  3 +
p
(3  2')2 + 24↵').
Note that 0 < r(',↵) < r(',↵) < '. Further, since bU(', r) and bD(', r) are strictly decreasing and strictly
increasing in r, respectively, and ↵ is strictly decreasing in its first argument and strictly increasing in its
second argument, it follows that the composition ↵(bU(', r), bD(', r)) is a strictly increasing function of r.
Therefore, if r  r(',↵), then ↵(bU(', r), bD(', r))  ↵, and by Theorem 1 (p⇤, q⇤) = (1, 0). By an anal-
ogous argument, if r   r(',↵), then (p⇤, q⇤) = (0, 1).33 Otherwise, if the monopolist sets a price level
r 2 (r(',↵), r(',↵)), then the asymptotically stable rest point will be interior and it will be given by
(p⇤, q⇤) =
⇣
pˆ(↵, bU(', r), bD(', r)), qˆ(↵, bU(', r), bD(', r))⌘, where pˆ and qˆ are the functions defined in Section 3.
Thus, the demand curve faced by the monopolist, Q : [0,1)! [0, 1], is given by
Q(r) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if 0  r  r(',↵)
2r2+r(3 2') 3↵'
4r(r ') if r(',↵) < r < r(',↵)
0 if r   r(',↵).
If the price is below a certain threshold the monopolist sells to the entire population. If it is above a certain
threshold no one buys the treatment in the long run. At intermediate prices the monopolist captures a fraction
of the population of both types. In this case, the demand curve is downward sloping and converges to 0 and 1
as the price goes to r(',↵) and r(',↵), respectively.
32This simplifies the analysis significantly. We leave the alternative, in which the monopolist has a positive discount rate and
maximizes the present value of all his future profits, for future research.
33The statement of Theorem 1 does not include the cutoﬀ values, which in this case correspond to r = r(',↵) and r = r(',↵),
since the techniques used to prove Theorem 1 are valid for hyperbolic rest-points and some rest points are non-hyperbolic at the
cutoﬀ values. Nevertheless, by directly applying the definition of asymptotic stability and constructing a straightforward "    
argument, it can be shown that for the prices r = r(',↵) and r = r(',↵), (p⇤, q⇤) is equal to (1, 0) and (0, 1), respectively.
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The monopolist optimal prices. We assume that the marginal costs of the monopolist are constant and
equal to k   0. The profit of the monopolist as a function of the price, G : [0,1)! R, is, hence, given by
G(r) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
r   k if 0  r  r(',↵)
(r   k)2r2+r(3 2') 3↵'4r(r ') if r(',↵) < r < r(',↵)
0 if r   r(',↵).
The elasticity of the demand curve drops to zero at r = r(',↵), price at which the monopolist would sell the
treatment to the whole market. Furthermore, when marginal costs are low enough, the right derivative of the
profit function with respect to the price is negative at r = r(',↵) and, thus, as we show below, the monopolist
chooses r = r(',↵). On the other hand, when the marginal costs are higher, he charges a higher price and
sells the treatment to only a fraction of the population. More precisely, we have the following relation between
marginal costs and the change in profits at the price at which the monopolist sells to the whole population.
Let G0(x+) denote the right derivative of G for all x 2 (r(',↵), r(',↵)).
Lemma 4 There is a unique marginal cost kˆ 2 (0, r(',↵)) such that G0(r(',↵)+) = 0. Further, G0(r(',↵)+) <
0 if k < kˆ and G0(r(',↵)+) > 0 if k > kˆ.
Proof. If k = 0, then
G0(r(',↵)+) = 1 + r(',↵)Q0(r(',↵)+) =
2'  3
2'  3 +p(3 + 2')2   24↵' < 0.
If k = r(',↵), then G0(r(',↵)+) = 1 > 0. Simple computations reveal that G0(r) is continuous and increasing
in k for all r 2 (r(',↵), r(',↵)). Hence, there is a unique kˆ 2 (0, r(',↵)) such that G0(r(',↵)+) = 1 +
(r(',↵)   kˆ)Q0(r(',↵)+) = 0. Further, by the monotonicity of G0(r(',↵)+) in k, G0(r(',↵)+) < 0 if k < kˆ
and G0(r(',↵)+) > 0 if k > kˆ.
The next result characterizes the optimal prices charged by the monopolist. The proof is provided in
Appendix E.
Proposition 3 Let r⇤ be the price that maximizes the monopolist’s profits. If k  kˆ, then r⇤ = r(',↵). If
k 2 (kˆ, r(',↵)), then r⇤ is the unique solution to G0(r) = 0 and it is contained in (r(',↵), r(',↵)). Otherwise,
if k   r(',↵), then the monopolist withdraws from the market.
If the marginal cost is low enough, when k < kˆ, the monopolist sets the highest price at which he sells to
the whole population. At a higher price he loses both type A and type B clients. In this case, the reduction in
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sales outweighs the positive eﬀect on profits of the higher price. If the marginal cost is suﬃciently high, when
k > r(',↵), the monopolist chooses not to produce. In this case, marginal costs may well be below type A
individuals’ willingness to pay, which occurs if k 2 (r(',↵),'). Here, at any price at which the monopolist
earns positive profits by selling the treatment, it is unattractive for type B individuals and not suﬃciently
attractive for type A individuals to the point that buying the treatment does not survive in the long run.
Finally, when marginal costs are at an intermediate level, the monopolist sells his treatment to a positive
fraction of both type A and type B individuals.
Figure 3 shows the inverse demand and marginal revenue curves of the monopolist (as a function of the
quantity). If the marginal cost is low, it is not intersected by the marginal revenue curve. The monopolist
then chooses a corner solution and charges the highest price at which he captures the entire market (the left
panel of Figure 3). When marginal costs are in the intermediate range the quantity sold in the market equates
marginal cost with marginal revenue (the right panel of Figure 3). If the marginal cost is suﬃciently high, the
monopolist withdraws from the market.
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Figure 3: The dashed line is the inverse demand curve, the solid line is marginal revenue and the dotted line is marginal
cost. ↵ = 1/2, ' = 0.4, k = 0.08 (left) and k = 0.14 (right).
Whenever kˆ < r(',↵) the optimal price is strictly increasing in both ↵ and '. With a larger ↵ the
dynamics towards buying the treatment are stronger due to the sampling eﬀects discussed before. With a
larger ' type A individuals tend to choose treatment more often while the sensitivity of type B individuals’
problem is unaﬀected. In both of these cases the monopolist loses fewer clients when raising the price and
therefore charges a higher price in equilibrium. The formal arguments for these comparative statics appear in
Appendix E.
Welfare analysis. Under full information, i.e., if the monopolist and individuals knew their type, the
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monopolist would set the price at ' and only type A individuals would buy the treatment. There would
hence be no deadweight loss in a standard computation of consumer and producer surplus. Further, the
monopolist would earn the entire surplus, equal to ↵(' k). When individuals are boundedly rational and the
monopolist sets the price at r⇤, (i) there is always a deadweight loss (except in the cases k = 0 and k   '),
(ii) the monopolist earns lower profits than under full information, and (iii) type A and type B individuals are
weakly better oﬀ and weakly worse oﬀ, respectively, than under full information. The deadweight loss in our
setup comes from two diﬀerent sources. First, whenever the treatment is sold in the market (i.e., whenever
k < r(',↵)) the cost of providing type B individuals with treatment causes a deadweight loss. Second,
whenever k 2 (kˆ,') a deadweight loss arises since some type A individuals do not buy treatment in spite of
having a willingness to pay that exceeds the marginal cost.
The profits of the monopolist are smaller in our setup compared to the case of full information.34 Intuitively,
type B individuals tend to not buy the treatment in their individual choices and this influences type A
individuals through sampling eﬀects. Therefore, in comparison to the case of full information, the monopolist
must lower his price to sell the treatment. Even if he sells the treatment to the entire population, the negative
eﬀect of the reduced price outweighs the positive eﬀect of increased sales.
Type A individuals are weakly better oﬀ in our setup since the monopolist extracts the entire surplus in
the case of full information. In contrast, here he may set a lower price, allowing type A individuals to obtain
a positive consumer surplus. Type B individuals are weakly worse oﬀ in our setup, since they may end up
buying a worthless treatment.
Biased sampling. While for simplicity the results here are obtained under the assumption of uniform
sampling, the analysis extends in a relatively straightforward manner to biased sampling (at the cost of slightly
more involved derivations). Under biased sampling ↵A(z) and ↵B(z) define cutoﬀ prices in an analogous way
as above. The homophily of each type aﬀects the cutoﬀ prices in the obvious way. Demand depends positively
on the homophily of type A and negatively on the homophily of type B and the monopolist’s profit follows
the same pattern. In the limit, when both types are perfectly homophilic, the monopolist sets some price very
close to ' and sells only to the entire type A population. In other words, perfect homophily brings us back to
the case of full information.
34For the formal argument, see Remark 8 in Appendix E.
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6 Discussion
In the benchmark model, we assume that individuals’ assessments of their expected payoﬀ relative to others
are unbiased. Individuals often make systematic mistakes in assessments of relative abilities.35 In Appendix
F, we illustrate the consequences of these mistakes by introducing biases in the comparison signal. The results
we obtain are qualitatively similar to those of the benchmark model. An analysis of this extension, however,
allows us to assess the eﬀect of biased comparison signals on the long-run equilibrium. We show that if type
⌧ individuals have positive biases, i.e., ⇡⌧⌧ 0c > ⇡⌧c   ⇡⌧ 0c for all ⌧ 0 2 T and c 2 S, this leads to a smaller
fraction of that type choosing their optimal action in the long run. We also consider the possibility of negative
biases and show that this leads to better long-run outcomes. Intuitively, if individuals have positive biases,
they switch more often to both their optimal and suboptimal action. Since in equilibrium most individuals of
at least one of the types are choosing their optimal action, more switching leads to excessive switching away
from the optimal action. In contrast, negative biases cause individuals to be more reluctant to switch and,
hence, to choose their optimal action more often. The details are provided in Appendix F.
Since we consider linear decision rules, there is no role for the accuracy of the comparison signal in our
setup. It is intuitive, however, that the experiences of people who are diﬀerent are less informative. Some
empirical evidence suggests that information about diﬀerent individuals is often discarded (see, e.g., Munshi
2004). This could be handled by assuming that the variance of the comparison signal is greater when observing
a diﬀerent type and by considering a concave decision rule. The experiences of diﬀerent individuals would then
be discounted relative to those of similar individuals. Therefore, there would be less switching towards the
actions chosen by individuals of the other type. This could lead to results similar to those of biased comparisons.
We leave a thorough analysis for future research.
Our model assumes an exogenous sampling process. In the presence of heterogeneity, however, individuals
may have incentives to search for individuals that are similar to them and hence more suitable to learn from.
At the same time, it seems that individuals would prefer to sample others who have made good choices (e.g.,
Oﬀerman and Schotter 2009). An analysis that considers an endogenous sampling process might provide
interesting insights into the implications of heterogeneity in the search for suitable role models.
Our model is qualitatively consistent with several empirical aspects of the process of diﬀusion of innovations.
In particular, it yields S-shaped adoption curves as those found in the empirical evidence. Furthermore, our
model is consistent with some features of the diﬀusion of hybrid corn in Kenya found by Suri (2011): less-than-
full final adoption, heterogeneities in returns to adoption, and equilibrium switching behavior. A quantitative
35For example, individuals tend to overestimate their abilities and performance at diﬀerent tasks, a phenomenon that is known
as positive self-image or overconfidence (see, e.g., Van den Steen 2004, Santos-Pinto and Sobel 2005).
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analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
7 Appendix A: Proof of Necessity in Proposition 1
We define the probability space (⌦ˆ, Fˆ ,µˆ) with ⌦ˆ = X2 ⇥ , Fˆ = 2X2⇥ , and the probability measure induced
by µ⌧c,⌧ 0d, which we call the environment. The (marginal) distribution functions µ⌧c, µ⌧ 0d and µ⌧⌧ 0d are derived
from µ⌧c,⌧ 0d in the usual way. Thus, the payoﬀ distribution of a type ⌧ individual who chooses c is µ⌧c and the
probability of the event {x 2 D}, with D ✓ X, is denoted by µ⌧c(D); and if D is a singleton {x}, with x 2 X,
then its probability is denoted by µ⌧c(x). The analogous notation conventions apply to the distributions of the
comparison signal and the payoﬀ distribution of a type ⌧ 0 individual who chooses d. Necessity in Proposition
1 is argued using the following lemmata.
Lemma 5 Suppose L is payoﬀ-ordering. Then, ⇡⌧d = ⇡⌧c implies Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) = 12 for all diﬀerent actions c, d
and types ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T .
Proof. Consider the environment induced by µ⌧c,⌧ 0d such that ⇡⌧d = ⇡⌧c and assume Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) < 12 (the
argument for the case Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) > 12 is analogous). We will now consider a diﬀerent environment induced by a
slightly diﬀerent probability mass, eµ⌧c,⌧ 0d. Suppose that payoﬀs and comparison-signals, in both environments,
are independent. The modified version of µ⌧d, denoted by eµ⌧d, is such that for any set I ⇢ X \ {1} we haveeµ⌧d(I) = (1 ")µ⌧d(I) and eµ⌧d(1) = µ⌧d(1)+"µ⌧d(X \{1}) for some " 2 (0, 1]. Thus, e⇡⌧d = (1 ")⇡⌧d+". The
modified version of µ⌧c, denoted by eµ⌧c, is such that for any I ⇢ X \ {0} we have eµ⌧c(I) = (1  ")µ⌧c(I) andeµ⌧c(0) = µ⌧c(0) + "µ⌧c(X \ {0}). Thus, e⇡⌧c = (1  ")⇡⌧c. The expected value, with the modified distribution,
of the comparison signal of a type ⌧ individual who observes a type ⌧ 0 individual who chooses d, denoted bye⇡⌧⌧ 0d, is
e⇡⌧⌧ 0d = (1  ")⇡⌧d + "  ⇡⌧ 0d
= (1  ") (⇡⌧d   ⇡⌧ 0d) + "(1  ⇡⌧ 0d)
= (1  ")⇡⌧⌧ 0d + "(1  ⇡⌧ 0d),
where ⇡⌧⌧ 0d is the expected value of the comparison signal in the initial environment. Suppose that the
distribution of this comparison signal in the modified environment is given by a compounded distribution which
weights with probabilities 1 " and " the distribution of the comparison signal in the initial environment and a
degenerate distribution which assigns all the probability to 1  ⇡⌧ 0d, respectively. In all the other respects, the
modified and initial environments are the same. Let eLcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) denote the expected value of the probability of
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switching to d when i 2 ⌧ chooses c, observes j 2 ⌧ 0 who chooses d and the comparison signal, in the modified
environment. Then, eLcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) can be written as a continuous function of " over the domain [0, 1] and when
" = 0, eLcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) = Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) < 12 . In order to see this, notice that
eLcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) = ˆ ˆ ˆ L(x, y,  )deµ⌧c(x)deµ⌧⌧ 0d( )deµ⌧ 0d(y)
=
ˆ ˆ 
"L(0, y,  ) + (1  ")
ˆ
L(x, y,  )dµ⌧c(x)
 
deµ⌧⌧ 0d( )dµ⌧ 0d(y)
=
ˆ ⇢
(1  ")
ˆ 
"L(0, y,  ) + (1  ")
ˆ
L(x, y,  )dµ⌧c(x)
 
dµ⌧⌧ 0d( )+
"

"L(0, y, 1  ⇡⌧ 0d) + (1  ")
ˆ
L(x, y, 1  ⇡⌧ 0d)dµ⌧c(x)
  
dµ⌧ 0d(y),
where the right hand side is a polynomial function of ". Thus, for small enough ", eLcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) < 12 and, sincee⇡⌧d > e⇡⌧c, L is not payoﬀ-ordering.
Corollary 2 If L is payoﬀ-ordering, x, y 2 [0, 1],   2 [ 1, 1], and x = y +  , then L(x, y,  ) = 12 .
Proof. Consider x, y,   which satisfy the hypothesis and an environment in which µ⌧c(x) = µ⌧d(y +  ) =
µ⌧ 0d(y) = µ⌧⌧ 0d( ) = 1.36 In this environment Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) = L(x, y,  ), and thus, Lemma 5 implies L(x, y,  ) = 12 .
Lemma 6 If L is payoﬀ-ordering, then L(x, y,  ) is an aﬃne transformation of y +     x for all x, y 2 [0, 1]
and   2 [ 1, 1].
Proof. Consider arbitrary x, y 2 [0, 1] and   2 [ 1, 1]. Consider an environment such that, with probability
1
2 , a first event occurs in which the payoﬀ received by type ⌧ when she chooses c is x, the payoﬀ received by
type ⌧ 0 individual when she chooses d is y, and the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual when
she observes the type ⌧ 0 individual is  . Otherwise, a second event occurs in which the payoﬀ received by a
type ⌧ individual when she chooses c is y, the payoﬀ received by a type ⌧ 0 individual when she chooses d is x,
and the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual when she observes a type ⌧ 0 individual is   . It
follows that ⇡⌧c = ⇡⌧d = x+y2 . If L is payoﬀ ordering, then Lcd(⌧, ⌧
0) = 12 , i.e.,
1
2
L(x, y,  ) +
1
2
L(y, x,  ) = 1
2
. (12)
Now consider a second environment that diﬀers from the previous one only in that the first event is replaced by
two events that occur with probability 12
y+  x+2
4 and
1
2
 
1  y+  x+24
 
, respectively. In the first of these events,
36Notice that since the payoﬀ-ordering property has to hold for arbitrary finite sets X ⇢ [0, 1] and   ⇢ [ 1, 1], the triplet
(x, y,  ) can be chosen arbitrarily within [0, 1]⇥ [0, 1]⇥ [ 1, 1] (as long as it satisfies the hypothesis of the corollary).
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the payoﬀ received by a type ⌧ individual when she chooses c is 0, the payoﬀ received by a type ⌧ 0 individual
when she chooses d is 1, and the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual when she observes a type
⌧ 0 individual is 1. In the second of these events, the payoﬀ received by a type ⌧ individual when she chooses c
is 1, the payoﬀ received by a type ⌧ 0 individual when she chooses d is 0, and the comparison signal observed by
a type ⌧ individual when she observes a type ⌧ 0 individual is  1. As in the previous environment, ⇡⌧c = ⇡⌧d
and, if L is payoﬀ ordering, then Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) = 12 , i.e.,
1
2
y +     x+ 2
4
L(0, 1, 1)+
1
2
✓
1  y +     x+ 2
4
◆
L(1, 0, 1)+1
2
L(y, x,  ) =1
2
. (13)
Subtracting (12) from (13), we obtain
L(x, y,  ) = L(1, 0, 1)+ (L(0, 1, 1)  L(1, 0, 1))
✓
1
2
+
y +     x
4
◆
.
It follows that L is a linear function of y +     x, and thus, from Corollary 2, L must satisfy L(x, y,  ) =
1
2 +  (y +     x) for some real number  .
Finally, consider x, y 2 [0, 1] and   2 [ 1, 1] such that y +   > x and the environment F such that
µ⌧c(x) = µ⌧d(y +  ) = µ⌧ 0d(y) = µ⌧⌧ 0d( ) = 1. Since Lcd(⌧, ⌧ 0) = L(x, y,  ) = 12 +  (y +     x), payoﬀ ordering
implies that   > 0.
To close the proof of Proposition 1, since the range of L is [0, 1], x, y 2 [0, 1], and   2 [ 1, 1], we also need
   14 .
8 Appendix B: Formal derivation of the dynamic system
We first introduce the probability space and individual space.
Probability space. The population is modeled as an index probability space (W,W , ) where W is the
continuum of individuals, W is a   algebra of subsets of W , and   is a super-atomless measure; in particular
 (A) = ↵ and  (B) = 1   ↵.37 Time is indexed by t 2 R+ with the Borel   algebra denoted by B. The
probability space that we use to model the random aspects of the imitation process is (⌦,F , P ).38
Dynamical system. Our analysis is concerned with the fraction of type A individuals choosing a, p(!, t),
and the fraction of type B individuals choosing b, q(!, t) for all ! 2 ⌦ and t 2 R+. In order to analyze the paths
(p(!, t), q(!, t))t2R+ , we define the state function ⇢ : W ⇥⌦⇥R+ ! ⌃ where ⇢(i,!, t) is the state of individual
37For a definition of super-atomless measures see Definition 5 and the appendix of Podczeck (2010).
38The analysis also assumes a right-continuous filtration {Ft : t 2 R+} in the probability space (⌦,F , P ), such that all null
events are included in F0; but this filtration will not appear (explicitly) in our analysis.
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i in the state of the world !, at time t. We also define the sampling function ⇡ : W ⇥ ⌦ ⇥ R+ ! W [ {J}
specifying the individual ⇡(i,!, t) that the individual i samples at time t in the state of the world !, where
⇡(i,!, t) = J means that individual i does not sample any other individual at time t in the state of the world
!. We assume that ⇡(i,!, t) 6= J implies ⇡(⇡(i,!, t),!, t) = i; that is, individuals sample each other.
The fraction of individuals whose state is   at time t in the state of the world !, denoted by p (!, t), is
given by p (!, t) =   ({i 2 W : ⇢(i,!, t) =  }) for all   2 ⌃, ! 2 ⌦, and t 2 R+. Therefore, we have the
following versions of (2) and (3) that express directly the state of the world dependence of the fractions of
individuals making optimal choices:
↵p(!, t) =
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p (!, t) (14)
and
(1  ↵)q(!, t) =
X
 2⌃:⌧=B,c=b
p (!, t). (15)
Diﬀerential equations of the system. We now provide the diﬀerential equations governing the fractions
of the population making their optimal choices within each type.
Proposition 4 Fix the initial fractions of the population in each individual state at (p (0)) 2⌃ 2  ˆ(⌃).
There exists a Fubini Extension (W ⇥ ⌦,W ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) 39 in which the state and sampling function (⇢, ⇡)
are defined, such that: (i) (p(!, t), q(!, t)) is deterministic almost surely; and (ii) for P almost all ! 2 ⌦,
(p(!, ·), q(!, ·)) : R+ ! [0, 1]2 is the solution of the system of diﬀerential equations
↵p˙ = ↵(1  p) [↵p+ (1  ↵)(1  q)]Lba(A)  ↵p [↵(1  p) + (1  ↵)q]Lab(A) (16)
(1  ↵)q˙ = (1  ↵)(1  q) [(1  ↵)q + ↵(1  p)]Lab(B)  (1  ↵)q [(1  ↵)(1  q) + ↵p]Lba(B), (17)
with initial condition (p(!, 0), q(!, 0)) =
⇣
↵ 1
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a p (0), (1  ↵) 1
P
 2⌃:⌧=B,c=b p (0)
⌘
.40
Before providing the proof of Proposition 4 we need to introduce the following definition, which is adapted
from Duﬃe, Qiao and Sun (2016).
Definition 2 Consider a pair of a state and a sampling function (⇢, ⇡) defined on a Fubini Extension (W ⇥
⌦,W ⇥F , ⇥P ), (p (0)) 2⌃ 2  ˆ(⌃), and
 
(&  0( 00)) 002⌃
 
( , 0)2⌃2 with (&  0( 
00)) 002⌃ 2  (⌃) for all ( ,  0) 2
39Theorem 1 in Podczeck (2010) shows that a suﬃcient condition allowing   ⇥ P to be a rich Fubini extension (i.e., a proper
extension of the product measure of   and P on W ⇥⌦ that allows for essentially pairwise independent random variables that are
not essentially constant), is that the measure in the index probability space ( ) is super-atomless, which we have assumed from
the outset.
40As in most of the equations below, the time and state-of-the-world dependence of p and q have been omitted.
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⌃2. The pair (⇢, ⇡) is said to be a continuous time dynamical system with independent random sampling and
independent random state-changing with parameters41 (p (0)) 2⌃ and
 
(&  0( 00)) 002⌃
 
( , 0)2⌃2 (denoted by DS)
if: (i) (p (!, t)) 2⌃ is deterministic almost surely with given initial conditions (p (!, 0)) 2⌃ = (p (0)) 2⌃; (ii)
for   almost every i 2 W , ⇢(i, ·, ·) is a continuous time Markov chain in ⌃ with transition intensity
R  00(!, t) =
X
 02⌃
p 0(!, t)&  0( 
00), (18)
for all two diﬀerent states   and  00 in ⌃, and R  (!, t) =  
P
 02⌃\{ }R  0(!, t) for all   2 ⌃, ! 2 ⌦, and
t 2 R+; (iii) ⇢(i,!, t) is (W ⇥ F)⌦ B measurable; and (iv) for   almost all i 2 W , ⇢(i, ·, t) and ⇢(j, ·, t) are
independent for   almost all j 2 W .
Now we are ready to provide the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. From Corollary 2 in Duﬃe, Qiao and Sun (2016), there exists a Fubini Extension (W⇥⌦,W⇥F , ⇥P )
such that the pair of state and sampling function (⇢, ⇡), defined on (W ⇥ ⌦,W ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ), is a DS with
parameters (p (0)) 2⌃ 2  ˆ(⌃) and
 
(&  0( 00)) 002⌃
 
( , 0)2⌃2 with (&  0( 
00)) 002⌃ 2  (⌃) for all ( ,  0) 2 ⌃2.42
From their Corollary 1, for P almost all !, (p (!, t)) 2⌃ is the solution of the system of diﬀerential equations
p˙ (!, t) =
X
 002⌃\{ }
p 00(!, t)
X
 02⌃
p 0(!, t)& 00 0( )  p (!, t)
X
 002⌃\{ }
X
 02⌃
p 0(!, t)&  0( 
00) (19)
for all   2 ⌃, with (p (!, 0)) 2⌃ = (p (0)) 2⌃. Therefore,43
↵p˙ =
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p˙ 
=
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
X
 002⌃\{ }
p 00
X
 02⌃
p 0& 00 0( ) 
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p 
X
 002⌃\{ }
X
 02⌃
p 0&  0( 
00) (20)
If ⌧ = A and ⌧ 00 = B, then & 00 0( ) = &  0( 00) = 0 for all  0 2 ⌃. Therefore, in both the minuend and
41In the definition in Duﬃe, Qiao and Sun (2016), dynamical systems also depend on parameters describing mutation intensities
and matching intensities. In our model there are no mutations so these parameters are all zero and hence we omit them, and the
matching intensities of our model are given by the fraction of the population of the state of the individual to be sampled; thus we
omit these parameters as well. We only consider diﬀerent intensities in Section 4 and Appendix D.
42Corollary 2 in Duﬃe, Qiao and Sun (2016) considers a slightly more general formulation of Definiton 2 (that, as mentioned in
footnote 41, allows for exogenous mutation rates of individual states and matching intensities functions where matching intensities
of individuals of diﬀerent states are not necessarily proportional to the fraction of the population of the individual state of the
sampled individual). For that more general formulation, this corollary establishes the existence of a Fubini Extension where a
DS (⇢,⇡) can be defined. Their Corollary 1, which we use below, provides the diﬀerential equations describing the path of the
expected value of the fraction of individuals in each individual state and establishes that the realization of this path is almost
surely equal to its expected value.
43In the rest of the proof we omit the time and state-of-the-world dependence of p , p, and q, and their time derivatives.
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subtrahend, the second summation is over { 00 2 ⌃ : ⌧ 00 = A}; thus,
↵p˙ =
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A
p 00
X
 02⌃
p 0& 00 0( ) 
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p 
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A
X
 02⌃
p 0&  0( 
00)
=
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A,c00=b
p 00
X
 02⌃
p 0& 00 0( ) 
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p 
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A,c00=b
X
 02⌃
p 0&  0( 
00),
where the second equality is obtained canceling the terms appearing in the minuend and subtrahend out. Next,
since c = a and c00 = b we have & 00 0( ) = 0 whenever c0 = b and &  0( 00) = 0 whenever c0 = a. Therefore, in
the minuend, the third summation is over { 0 2 ⌃ : c0 = a} and, in the subtrahend, the third summation is
over { 0 2 ⌃ : c0 = b}. Thus,
↵p˙ =
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
X
 00:⌧ 00=A,c00=b
p 00
X
 02⌃:c0=a
p 0& 00 0( ) 
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p 
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A,c00=b
X
 02⌃:c0=b
p 0&  0( 
00).(21)
The minuend in the right-hand-side of (21), denoted by M , may be written as
M =
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A,c00=b
X
 02⌃:c0=a
p 00p 0
 X
 :⌧=A,c=a
& 00 0( )
!
=
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A,c00=b
X
 02⌃:c0=a
p 00p 0L(x
00, x0,  00⌧ 0),
where we have used the definition of
 
(&  0( 00)) 002⌃
 
( , 0)2⌃2 in (1) and the fact that
X
 :⌧=A,c=a
µAa(x)µAAb( A)µABb( B) = 1.
Therefore,
M =
X
 002⌃:⌧=A,c=b
 X
 02⌃:⌧ 0=A,c0=a
p 00p 0L(x
00, x0,  00A) +
X
 02⌃:⌧ 0=B,c0=a
p 00p 0L(x
00, x0,  00B)
!
= ↵(1  p)↵p
X
x002X, 00A2 
 X
x02X
µAb(x
00)µAa(x0)µAAa( 00A)L(x
00, x0,  00A)
!
+↵(1  p)(1  ↵)(1  q)
X
x002X, 00B2 
 X
x02X
µAb(x
00)µBa(x0)µABa( 00B)L(x
00, x0,  00B)
!
= ↵(1  p) [↵p+ (1  ↵)(1  q)]Lba(A),
where the second equality follows from the fact that
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1.
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p  = ↵pµAa(x0),
2.
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=b,x=x0, A=  p  = ↵(1  p)µAb(x0)µAAa( ),
3.
P
 2⌃:⌧=B,c=a,x=x0 p  = (1  ↵)(1  q)µBa(x0), and
4.
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=b,x=x0, B=  p  = ↵(1  p)µAb(x0)µABa( ),
for all x0 2 X and   2  .44
Similarly, the subtrahend of (21) can be written as
 
X
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a
p 
X
 002⌃:⌧ 00=A,c00=b
X
 02⌃:c0=b
p 0&  0( 
00) =  ↵p [↵(1  p) + (1  ↵)q]Lab(A)
thus,
↵p˙ = ↵(1  p) [↵p+ (1  ↵)(1  q)]Lba(A)  ↵p [↵(1  p) + (1  ↵)q]Lab(A).
The analogous argument yields (17).
9 Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First we establish asymptotic stability. Define the Jacobian matrix of (p˙, q˙)
J(p, q) :=
24p˙1(p, q) p˙2(p, q)
q˙1(p, q) q˙2(p, q)
35 ,
where p˙i(p, q) and q˙i(p, q) denote the corresponding partial derivatives of p˙(p, q) and q˙(p, q) with respect to
their ith arguments, i.e., with respect to p or q. A rest point (p⇤, q⇤) is asymptotically stable if the real
part of the eigenvalues of J(p⇤, q⇤) are negative (see, e.g., Sydsaeter, Hammond, Seierstad and Strom 2008,
Theorems 6.8.1 and 7.5.1). This is equivalent to Det(J(p⇤, q⇤)) > 0 and Tr(J(p⇤, q⇤)) < 0, where Det(J(p⇤, q⇤))
and Tr(J(p⇤, q⇤)) are the determinant and trace of J(p⇤, q⇤), respectively. Consider first (1, 0). We have
Tr(J(1, 0)) = 2D   (1 + U)   ↵(U + D   1) < 0. Next, Det(J(1, 0)) = U(1   2D) + ↵(U + D   1) > 0 is
44To see why 1. holds observe that, from (19), we have
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p˙  is equal toP
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0
P
 002⌃\{ } p 00
P
 02⌃ p 0& 00 0( )  
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p 
P
 002⌃\{ }
P
 02⌃ p 0&  0( 
00). From (1), the
minuend is µAa(x0) times the minuend in (20). The initial conditions imply that, at time t = 0, the subtrahend is µAa(x0)
times the subtrahend in (20). Thus, at t = 0,
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p˙  = µAa(x0)↵p˙. Therefore, at t = 0, the right derivative ofP
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p /(↵p) with respect to t is 0. Furthermore, the derivative of
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p /(↵p) with respect to t
is negative (positive) when
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p  > (<)µAa(x0). Thus,
P
 2⌃:⌧=A,c=a,x=x0 p /(↵p) is constant over time and
equal to its value at t = 0, µAa(x0). The proof of the facts 2.-4. is similar and it is omitted.
35
equivalent to ↵ > U(1 2D)U+D 1 = ↵. An analogous calculation holds for (0, 1). Now, consider (pˆ, qˆ). Note that
Tr(J(pˆ, qˆ)) =
2U(1  U)(↵ + (1  2D)2) + 2D(1 D)(2  ↵)  1
(2D   1)(2U   1) < 0.
Next,
Det(J(pˆ, qˆ)) =
(↵(U +D   1)  (1  U)(2D   1))(U(2D   1)  ↵(U +D   1))
(2U   1)(2D   1) > 0
if ↵ > (1 U)(2D 1)(U+D 1) = ↵ and ↵ <
U(2D 1)
(U+D 1) = ↵.
In order to prove that the asymptotically stable points are global attractors, notice that p˙2, q˙1 < 0, hence
limt!1(p(t), q(t)) 2 RP for all paths (see, e.g., Theorem 3.4.1 in Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). It is easy to
verify that all (p, q) 2 RP \ {(p⇤, q⇤)} are saddle-path stable with no stable arm in [0, 1]2. Hence, the system
always converges to the asymptotically stable point.
10 Appendix D: Proofs Section 4
10.1 Dynamical systems with biased sampling
In this subsection we briefly sketch how to derive (10)-(11). The general version of equation (18), when we
allow for general intensities, is
R  00(!, t) =
X
 02⌃
✓  0((p 000(!, t)) 0002⌃)&  0( 00)
and the corresponding version of equation (19) is45
p˙  =
X
 002⌃\{ }
p 00
X
 02⌃
✓ 00 0((p 000) 0002⌃)& 00 0( )  p 
X
 002⌃\{ }
X
 02⌃
✓  0((p 000) 0002⌃)&  0( 00). (22)
Then, (22) and analogous derivations to those following equation (19) in Appendix B yield (10)-(11).
10.2 Proofs of Stable equilibria
First we provide the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. (of Lemma 2) (i) We use the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix of the system (4)-(5). Recall
that (p, q) is asymptotically stable if and only if Det(J(p, q)) > 0 and Tr(J(p, q)) < 0. Now, Det(J(1, 0)) =
45Dependence on time and state of the world are omitted in the notation.
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U  D+↵BD(1 2U)+↵A(2D 1)(1 U)) > 0 if and only if ↵A > ↵A(↵B). ↵A(↵B)   1 for all ↵B   1 DD , so
if ↵A > ↵A(↵B), then ↵B < 1 DD . Finally, if ↵B <
1 D
D , then Tr(J(1, 0)) = ↵A 1 U(1+↵A)+D(1+↵B) < 0.
(ii) is established analogously. (iii) follows from (i) and (ii) and the fact that ↵A(↵B) >
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B) for all
↵B 2 (0, 1).
We now provide the proof of Corollary 1.
Proof. (of Corollary 1) Part (i) follows by observing that ↵A(↵B) > 1 for all ↵B > 1 DD , and if U > D, then
↵A(↵B) < 0 for all ↵B < U DD(2U 1) . An analogous argument proves (ii).
Now we provide the results that lead to the proof of Lemma 3. Define [p 1] : [0, 1]! [0, 1] with [p 1](p) :=
max{q : p(q) = p} for all p 2 [0, 1]. Define [q 1] : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] with [q 1](q) = max{p : q(p) = q} for
all q 2 [0, 1]. Notice that p is strictly decreasing on {q 2 [0, 1] : p(q) < 1}. To see this, note that the
concavity of p and p(0) = 1 together imply that for all q 2 (0, 1] such that p(q) < 1 and   2 (0, 1] we have
p((1  )q) = p( 0+(1  )q)    1+(1  )p(q) > p(q). Combining with the fact that p(1) = 0, it follows that
p is strictly decreasing on [w, 1] and there is no q 2 [0, w] with p(q) 2 [0, 1), where w := [p 1](1). Therefore,
[p 1] is the well defined real-valued inverse function of p in the restricted domain [w, 1] (with range [0, 1]),
which is a continuous, decreasing, and concave function. An analogous argument holds for q and [q 1].
Remark 4 (i) ↵A > (<)↵A(↵B) if and only if p0(0) < (>)[q 1]0(0). (ii) ↵B > (<)↵B(↵A) if and only if
q0(0) < (>)[p 1]0(0).
Proof. (i) Notice that [q 1]0(0) = 1
q0(q 1(0)) =
1
q0(1) . Next, p
0(0) = ↵BD+D 1D(1 ↵B) and
1
q0(1) =
(1 U)(1 ↵A)
↵A(1 U) U and
↵BD+D 1
D(1 ↵B) <
(1 U)(1 ↵A)
↵A(1 U) U can be written ↵A >
U D+↵BD(1 2U)
(1 U)(1 2D) = ↵A(↵B). Analogous calculations hold for (ii).
In the sequel, unless stated otherwise, the domains of p and q are the whole set of real numbers. The
following results follow from straightforward calculus:
Remark 5 q(p(q))   q = 0 is a polynomial equation of degree 4, and consequently has at most 4 diﬀerent
solutions in q 2 R.
Remark 6 q(p) has the following properties: (i) q(0) = 1 and q(1) = 0, (ii) limp!1 q(p) =   limp! 1 q(p) =
limp!1
⇣
↵A(2U 1) U
(1 ↵A)(1 2U) +
↵A
1 ↵Ap
⌘
, (iii) q is discontinuous only at U2U 1 . In particular limp!( U2U 1 )  q(p) =  1
and limp!( U2U 1 )+ q(p) = 1 and (iv) q has two local extrema, a local maximum at some p < 1 and a local
minimum at some p > U/(2U   1).
The following Lemma shows that one of the four roots of q(p(q))  q = 0 is located outside of [0, 1], which
implies that if there is an interior rest point it is unique.
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Lemma 7 If ↵A 6= 1   ↵B, then there is some z 62 [0, 1] such that q(p(z))   z = 0 with p(z) 2 ( 1, 0) [
( U2U 1 ,1).
Proof. (i) Consider the case ↵A1 ↵A <
1 ↵B
↵B
. Consider q with its domain restricted to ( U2U 1 ,1) and p with
its domain restricted to ( D2D 1 ,1). Both q and p are continuous on ( U2U 1 ,1) and ( D2D 1 ,1), respectively.
Since lim
p!1
q(p) = 1 and lim
q!( D2D 1 )+
p(q) = 1 there is a point q0 2 ( D2D 1 ,1) (close to D2D 1) such that q0 <
q(p(q0)), which means that (p(q0), q0) is in the subgraph of q(p). Next, given that ↵A1 ↵A <
1 ↵B
↵B
there is some
q00 2 ( D2D 1 ,1) (suﬃciently large) such that p(q00) ' ↵B(2D 1) D(1 ↵B)(1 2D) + ↵B1 ↵B q00, q(p(q00)) '
↵A(2U 1) U
(1 ↵A)(1 2U) +
↵A
1 ↵Ap(q
00)
and q00 '   (1 ↵B)(1 2D)↵B(2D 1) D 1 ↵B↵B + 1 ↵B↵B p(q00) > q(p(q00)). This means that (p(q00), q00) is in the epigraph of q(p).
From Remark 6 and an analogous analysis for p, we have that p is continuous on ( D2D 1 ,1), q is continuous
on ( U2U 1 ,1) and limp!1q(p) = limp!( U2U 1 )+
q(p) = 1. Since (p(q0), q0) is in the subgraph of q and (p(q00), q00) is in
the epigraph of q(p), with q0, q00 2 ( D2D 1 ,1), there is a point (p(z), z) with z 2 ( D2D 1 ,1) that is both in the
subgraph and in the epigraph of q. Hence q(p(z)) = z for some z 62 [0, 1], such that p(z) 2 ( U2U 1 ,1).
Consider ↵A1 ↵A >
1 ↵B
↵B
. Consider q and p with their domains restricted to [0, 1). Both q and p are
continuous on [0, 1). The point (p(q0), q0), with q0 2 [0, 1) such that p(q0) = 0 is in the subgraph of
q(p), because q(p(q0)) = 1 > q0. Next, given that ↵A1 ↵A >
1 ↵B
↵B
there is some q00 2 (0, 1) (suﬃciently small)
such that p(q00) ' ↵B(2D 1) D(1 ↵B)(1 2D) + ↵B1 ↵B q00, q(p(q00)) '
↵A(2U 1) U
(1 ↵A)(1 2U) +
↵A
1 ↵Ap(q
00) and q00 '   (1 ↵B)(1 2D)↵B(2D 1) D 1 ↵B↵B +
1 ↵B
↵B
p(q00) > q(p(q00)). This means that (p(q00), q00) is in the epigraph of q. Since p and q are continuous on
[0,1), and since (p(q0), q0) is in the subgraph of q and (p(q00), q00) is in the epigraph of q, there must be a point
(p(z), z), with z 2 ( 1, 0), that is both in the subgraph and in the epigraph of q. Hence q(p(z)) = z for some
z 2 ( 1, 0) at which p(z) 2 ( 1, 0).
Hence, q(p(z))  z = 0 for some z 2 ( 1, 0) [ ( D2D 1 ,1).
Now we provide the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. (of Lemma 3) (i) Suppose ↵A > ↵A(↵B). Then by Remark 4 p0(0) < [q 1]0(0). Define [eq 1] :
( 1, 0] ! R with [eq 1](q) := {p : q(p) = q} for q 2 ( 1, 0]. Both [eq 1] and p are continuous on ( 1, 0).
Since p0(0) < [eq 1]0(0) there is some q0 < 0 (close to 0) such that p(q0) > [eq 1](q0). Next, lim
q!1
p(q) =  1
while lim
q!1
[eq 1](q) = U2U 1 . This means that there is some suﬃciently large q00 such that p(q00) > [eq 1](q00).
Hence, there is some z 2 ( 1, 0) such that p(z) = [eq 1](z) and 1 < p(z) < U2U 1 . Since there are at most four
solutions to q(p(p)) p = 0 and there is one with p(q) 2 ( 1, 0)[( U2U 1 ,1) and one such that p(q) 2 (1, U2U 1)
there is no solution in (0, 1). An analogous argument holds if ↵B > ↵B(↵A).
(ii) Suppose. ↵A < ↵A(↵B) or ↵B < ↵B(↵A). By Remark 4 q0(0) > [p 1]0(0), which means that there is
some p0 2 (0, 1) (close to 0) such that q(p0) > [p 1](p0). By Remark 4 p0(0) > [q 1]0(0), which means that there
is some p00 2 (0, 1) (close to 1) such that q(p00) < [p 1](p00). Since [p 1](p) and q(p) are continuous on (0, 1)
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there is some z 2 (0, 1) such that [p 1](z) = q(z) and hence there is an interior rest point.
If ↵A = 1   ↵B the expression for the interior rest point is given by (ep, eq) = (bp, bq). The following result
provides the expression for the interior rest point (ep, eq) when ↵A 6= 1  ↵B.
Lemma 8 Suppose ↵A 6= 1  ↵B. Then,
ep = (↵A + ↵B   1)(U  D + 2↵AU(2D   1)) + ↵A↵B(1  U  D))
2↵A(↵A + ↵B   1)(2U   1)(2D   1)
+
vuuut 4↵A(↵A + ↵B   1)(2D   1)(1  ↵A)U [U(1  ↵A)  ↵B(2U   1)(1 D) D + 2↵AUD]
+ [(↵A + ↵B   1)(U  D + 2↵AU(2D   1)) + ↵A↵B(1  U  D))]2
2↵A(↵A + ↵B   1)(2U   1)(2D   1)
The expression for eq is analogous.
Proof. The terms p and 1   p can be factored out from the left hand side of the fourth degree polynomial
p(q(p))   p = 0. It is thus obtained that any interior rest point must be a solution to the second degree
polynomial
↵A(↵A + ↵B   1)(1  2U)2(2D   1)p2
 (2U   1) [(↵A + ↵B   1)(U  D + 2↵AU(2D   1)) + ↵A↵B(1  U  D)] p
 (1  ↵A)U [U(1  ↵A)  ↵B(2U   1)(1 D) D + 2↵AUD] = 0
The expression in the statement of the lemma is obtained by applying the quadratic formula and observing
that ep 2 (0, 1) is only consistent with the positive square root.
We now provide the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. (of Proposition 2) Since p˙2(p, q), q˙1(p, q) < 0 the system always converges to a rest point as t!1 (see,
e.g., Theorem 3.4.1 in Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). If ↵A > ↵A(↵B), then, by Lemma 3, RP = {(1, 0), (0, 1)}.
By Lemma 2, (0, 1) is not asymptotically stable. Furthermore, (0, 1) has no stable arm in [0, 1]2. Hence,
the system converges to (1, 0). Analogously if ↵A <
⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B), then the system converges to (0, 1). If⇥
↵ 1B
⇤
(↵B) < ↵A < ↵A(↵B), then by Lemma 3, RP = {(1, 0), (0, 1), (ep, eq)}, for some (ep, eq) 2 (0, 1)2. By
Lemma 2, (1, 0) and (0, 1) are not asymptotically stable and, furthermore, have no stable arm in [0, 1]2.
Hence, the system converges to (ep, eq).
10.3 Proofs for comparative statics of Section 4
Remark 7 (i) ep1(↵A,↵B) > 0, (ii) ep2(↵A,↵B) < 0, (iii) eq1(↵A,↵B) > 0 and (iv) eq2(↵A,↵B) < 0.
Proof. eq(↵A,↵B) is defined by q(p(eq(↵A,↵B)))  eq(↵A,↵B) = 0. To establish (iv), we diﬀerentiate implicitly
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and obtain
@eq
@↵B
=   q
0(p(eq(↵A,↵B)))@p(eq(↵A,↵B))@↵B
q0(p(eq(↵A,↵B))p0(eq(↵A,↵B))  1 .
Consider first the denominator. It holds that [p 1]0(ep(↵A,↵B)) > q0(p(eq(↵A,↵B))). This means 1p0(eq(↵A,↵B)) >
q0(p(eq(↵A,↵B))), or 1 < q0(p(eq(↵A,↵B)))p0(eq(↵A,↵B)). Therefore, the denominator is positive. Now consider
the denominator. Note that @p(eq(↵A,↵B))@↵B > 0 and q0(p(eq(↵A,↵B))) < 0. Hence, the numerator is negative, so
@eq(↵A,↵B)
@↵B
> 0. An analogous procedure yields
@eq(↵A,↵B)
@↵A
=  
@q(p(eq(↵A,↵B)))
@↵A
q0(p(eq(↵A,↵B))p0(eq(↵A,↵B))  1 < 0.
Analogous arguments yield (i) and (ii).
We now provide the proof of Remark 3.
Proof. (of Remark 3) Consider a large enough ↵A such that there is some p0 2 (0, 1) with p˙(p0, 1) = 0.
Then, since q is concave and its graph contains (p0, 1) and (1, 0) it holds that ep(↵A,↵B) > p0. Next, p˙(p0, 1) =
↵Ap0(1   p0)(2U   1)   (1   ↵A)p0(U   1) = 0 implies p0 = ↵AU+U 1↵A(2U 1) , which approaches 1 as ↵A ! 1. Sinceep(↵A,↵B) > p0, we obtain that lim
↵A!1
ep(↵A,↵B) = 1. An analogous argument holds for eq(↵A,↵B).
11 Appendix E: Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Proposition 3. Since G(r) = 0 for all r   ' and G is continuous on [0,'], it attains its maximum
somewhere in this interval. Both Q and G are twice continuously diﬀerentiable on (r(',↵), r(',↵)). Let G0(x+)
and G0(x ) (corresp. Q0(x+) and Q0(x )) denote the right and left derivatives, respectively, of G (corresp. Q)
for all x 2 (r(',↵), r(',↵)).
Suppose k   r(',↵). Then G(r) < 0 for all r 2 [0, r(',↵)) and G(r) = 0 for all r   r(',↵). Hence, in this
case, the monopolist withdraws from the market.
Suppose k < r(',↵). Then
G0(r(',↵) ) = Q(r(',↵)) + (r(',↵)  k)Q0(r(',↵) ) = (r(',↵)  k)Q0(r(',↵) ) < 0.
Hence, in this case r⇤ < r(',↵). From Lemma 4, G0(r(',↵)+) > 0 if k > kˆ. Hence, if k > kˆ , then r⇤ > r(',↵).
This proves that r⇤ 2 (r(',↵), r(',↵)) if k 2 (kˆ, r(',↵)). In order to see that in this case r⇤ is the unique
solution to G0(r) = 0, first note that G(r) < 0 for r < k and hence, r⇤   k. Next, for any k, r such that
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0  k  r 2 (r(',↵), r(',↵)) we have that
G00(r) = 2Q0(r) + (r   k)Q00(r) < 0.
If Q00(r)  0 this is obvious. Note that if k = 0 then
G00(r) = 2Q0(r) + rQ00(r) =  3(1  ↵)'
2('  r)3 < 0
for r < '. Thus, if Q00(r)   0 then G00(r) = 2Q0(r)+(r k)Q00(r)  2Q0(r)+rQ00(r) < 0. G is therefore strictly
concave on (k, r(',↵)) which together with G0(k) > 0 implies that r⇤ is the unique solution to G0(r) = 0.
Suppose k  kˆ. Then, from Lemma 4, G0(r(',↵)+) < 0 and G is strictly concave on (r(',↵), r(',↵)) given
k  kˆ < r(',↵). Since G0(r(',↵)+) < 0 we have G0(r) < 0 for all r 2 (r(',↵), r(',↵)). Finally, since G is
increasing on [0, r(',↵)) we obtain r⇤ = r(',↵).
Comparative Statics. Note that @r(',↵)/@', @r(',↵)/@↵, @r(',↵)/@', @r(',↵)/@↵ > 0. Further, if
k 2 (kˆ, r(',↵)) then G0(r⇤) = 0 and G00(r⇤) < 0 (see the proof of Proposition 3). Implicit diﬀerentiation gives
@r⇤
@k
=   Q
0(r⇤)
G00(r⇤)
> 0
@r⇤
@'
=  @Q(r
⇤)/@'+ (r⇤   k)@Q0(r⇤)/@'
G00(r⇤)
> 0
@r⇤
@↵
=  @Q(r
⇤)/@↵ + (r⇤   k)@Q0(r⇤)/@↵
G00(r⇤)
> 0,
where the sign of the derivative follows since the denominator is negative and the numerator can be shown to
be positive in all three cases. Hence, whenever k < r(',↵), r⇤ is strictly increasing in k,↵ and '.
Finally, the following remark shows that the monopolist’s profits in this setup are smaller than under full
information.
Remark 8 Let Gˆ := ↵('   k) be the monopolist’s profit under full information. Then Gˆ > G(r⇤) for all
k 2 [0,').
Proof. (i) If k 2 [0, kˆ], then G(r⇤) = r(',↵)   k. Simple calculations show that ↵('   k) > r(',↵)   k.
(ii) If k 2 [r(',↵),') then G(r⇤) = 0 < ↵('   k) = Gˆ. Consider k 2 (kˆ, r(',↵)). Note that @Gˆ@k =  ↵ and
@G(r⇤)
@k =  Q(r⇤). We also know that Q(r⇤) is continuously decreasing in k. This implies that Gˆ   G(r⇤) is
concave in k and, by (i) and (ii), we thus have Gˆ > G(r⇤) for all k 2 (kˆ, r(',↵)).
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12 Appendix F: Biased comparisons
Here, we analyze the consequences of introducing biases in the comparison signal. We make the simplifying
assumption that the comparison bias does not depend on the observed action or the observed individual. We
do allow, however, the bias to vary across types. Let "⌧ be the bias of type ⌧ individuals. Therefore, the
expected value of the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual who samples a type ⌧ 0 individual
choosing c is ⇡⌧⌧ 0c = ⇡⌧c   ⇡⌧ 0c + "⌧ , for all ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T and c 2 S. If "⌧ > (<)0, then type ⌧ individuals have
positive (negative) biases. As in the benchmark model, we assume that the comparison signal takes values in
a finite set with minimum  1 and maximum 1. Notice that this imposes "⌧ 2 [⇡⌧ 0c ⇡⌧c  1, 1+⇡⌧ 0c ⇡⌧c] for
all c 2 S. This yields Lcd(⌧) = 12 +  (⇡⌧d  ⇡⌧c) +  "⌧ and therefore Lba(A) = U +  "A, Lab(A) = 1 U +  "A,
Lba(B) = 1 D +  "B and Lab(B) = D +  "B. It follows that if individuals have positive biases, they switch
more often, both to their optimal and suboptimal action. If they have negative biases, they are instead more
reluctant to switch. The system of diﬀerential equations becomes
p˙ = ↵p(1  p)(2U   1) + (1  ↵)((1  p)(1  q)(U +  "A)  pq(1  U +  "A)) (23)
q˙ = (1  ↵)q(1  q)(2D   1) + ↵((1  q)(1  p)(D +  "B)  qp(1 D +  "B)). (24)
Qualitatively, system (23)-(24) behaves similarly to (4)-(5). Depending on the parameters, the system converges
to either a corner or an interior rest point. Let
↵"("A, "B) :=
(1  U +  "A)(2D   1)
U +D   1 +  "B(2U   1) +  "A(2D   1)
and
↵"("A, "B) :=
(U +  "A)(2D   1)
U +D   1 +  "B(2U   1) +  "A(2D   1) .
Also let pˆ("A, "B) := ( "A+U)(↵ ↵
"("A,"B))
↵(2U 1) and qˆ("A, "B) :=
( "B+D)(↵"("A,"B) ↵)
(1 ↵)(2D 1) . Using an argument analogous
to that in Section 3 we obtain the following result.
Remark 9 For all paths such that (p(0), q(0)) /2 {(0, 1), (1, 0)},
lim
t!1
(p(t), q(t)) =
8>>><>>>:
(0, 1) if ↵ < ↵"("A, "B)
(pˆ("A, "B), qˆ("A, "B)) if ↵"("A, "B) < ↵ < ↵"("A, "B)
(1, 0) if ↵ > ↵"("A, "B).
42
We now consider how the predictions of the model respond to changes in "A and "B. For concreteness
we focus on "A. First, ↵"1("A, "B),↵"1("A, "B) > 0. This means that, as type A individuals’ bias increases,
the system converges to (0, 1) for a larger set of parameter configurations and to (1, 0) for a smaller set of
parameters. Next, we obtain that
pˆ1("A, "B) =
"A(↵  ↵"("A, "B))  ("A + U)↵"1("A, "B)
↵(2U   1) < 0.
Hence, the outcome becomes worse for type A individuals as their bias increases. On the other hand
qˆ1("A, "B) > 0, i.e., type B individuals benefit from type A individuals’ bias. If we take as a starting
point "A = "B = 0, these results imply that type A individuals are aﬀected negatively by their bias, while type
B individuals benefit from this. On the other hand, type A individuals obtain a better outcome when their
bias decrease, while type B individuals are negatively aﬀected by this.
There is a simple intuition behind these results. As we see in equations (23)-(24), the eﬀect of the bias
on p˙ depends on p and q. If the biases are positive, there is a positive eﬀect for small values of p and q
(more precisely, below the line q = 1   p) and a negative eﬀect for large values. The isoclines in the phase
diagrams are always above the line q = 1   p, however. Intuitively, when q is large, it is diﬃcult to find a
type B individual choosing a. At the same time, when p is large, there is only a small fraction of type A
individuals choosing b and who are therefore candidates to switch to action a. Hence, switching towards action
a in A is small, and the positive eﬀect of the bias on this switching is, therefore, relatively unimportant. In
contrast, there are many type A individuals choosing a that observe type B individuals choosing b, and hence
the eﬀect of the bias on these switches is larger. The result is that a positive bias causes a net increase in
switching towards b among type A individuals, which in the end makes A worse oﬀ. The opposite occurs when
type A individuals have negative biases. A negative bias reduces switching, and at large values of p and q
this inhibits switching away from a to a greater extent than it inhibits switching away from b. This leads to a
larger fraction of type A individuals choosing their optimal action in the long run. By the same logic as in the
benchmark model, whatever causes a stronger motion towards a among type A individuals has a negative eﬀect
on type B individuals. Hence, when type A individuals have negative biases and obtain a better outcome,
type B individuals are worse oﬀ. Analogously, when type A individuals have positive biases and obtain a worse
outcome, this benefits type B individuals.
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